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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new fragment of the rst-order temporal language, called the
monodic fragment, in which all formulas beginning with a temporal operator (Since or Until)
have at most one free variable. We show that the satisability problem for monodic formulas in
various linear time structures can be reduced to the satisability problem for a certain fragment
of classical rst-order logic. This reduction is then used to single out a number of decidable
fragments of rst-order temporal logics and of two-sorted rst-order logics in which one sort is
intended for temporal reasoning. Besides standard rst-order time structures, we consider also
those that have only nite rst-order domains, and extend the results mentioned above to temporal
logics of nite domains. We prove decidability in three dierent ways: using decidability of
monadic second-order logic over the intended ows of time, by an explicit analysis of structures
with natural numbers time, and by a composition method that builds a model from pieces in
nitely many steps. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
MSC: 03B25; 03B45; 68Q60; 68T30
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1. Introduction
Temporal logic has found numerous applications in computer science, ranging from
the traditional and well-developed elds of program specication and verication [34,
30, 31], temporal databases [12, 13, 3, 42, 17], and distributed and multi-agent systems
[15], to more recent uses in knowledge representation and reasoning [6{8, 40, 46]. This
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is true of both propositional and rst-order temporal logic. However, the mainstream
of theoretical studies in the discipline has mostly been restricted to the propositional
case { witness the surveys [14, 43], or the two-volume monograph [16, 17] where only
one chapter is devoted to rst-order temporal logics.
The reason for this seems clear. Though some axiomatizations of rst-order tem-
poral logics are known (e.g. [38] presents axiomatizations for rst-order logics with
Until and Since over the class of all linear ows and over the rationals), a series of
incompleteness theorems [1, 4, 16, 19, 32, 44, 45], started by unpublished results of
Scott and Lindstrom in the 1960s, show that many of the rst-order temporal logics
most useful in computer science are not even recursively enumerable. But in contrast to
classical rst-order logic, where the early undecidability results of Turing and Church
stimulated research and led to a rich and profound theory concerned with classifying
fragments of rst-order logic according to their decidability (see, e.g. [9]), there were
no serious attempts to convert the ‘negative’ results in rst-order temporal logic into
a classication problem. Apparently, the extremely weak expressive power of the tem-
poral formulas required to prove undecidability left no hope that any useful decidable
fragments located ‘between’ propositional and rst-order temporal logics could ever be
found. (See, e.g., Theorems 2 and 3 below.)
The main aim of this paper is to dene and investigate a new kind of sub-language
of the rst-order temporal language which, on the one hand, is considerably more
expressive than the propositional language, yet on the other hand gives rise to decid-
able fragments of rst-order temporal logics. Roughly speaking, these fragments are
obtained by:
(1) restricting the pure classical (non-temporal) part of the language to an arbitrary
decidable fragment of rst-order logic, and
(2) restricting the temporal part of the language to the monodic formulas whose sub-
formulas beginning with a temporal operator have at most one free variable.
Condition (1) allows the use of classical decidability results to select a suitable rst-
order part of the language, while (2) leaves enough room for non-trivial interactions
between quantiers and temporal operators (as in the Barcan formula, 9x’(x)$
9x’(x)). Thus, we can talk about objects in the intended domain using the full
power of the selected fragment of rst-order logic; however, temporal operators may
be used to describe the development in time of only one object (two are enough to
simulate the behaviour of Turing machines or tilings; see below).
The bulk of the paper is devoted to showing that these two conditions do result
in decidable temporal fragments over various ows of time. As a consequence, we
obtain for instance that the two-variable monodic fragment, and the temporal guarded
monodic fragment, are decidable where the ow of time is arbitrary, nite, hN;<i,
hZ;<i, hQ;<i, or (for nite domains at least) hR;<i. The obtained results and the
developed techniques can be applied to prove the decidability of various propositional
multi-dimensional modal logics, including some temporal epistemic logics close to
those in [15] and used in multi-agent systems, and temporal description logics used in
knowledge representation (cf. [46]). Thus, the results of the paper are of signicance
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both for applications in CS and AI, and for theoretical studies in temporal logic.
Moreover, we hope that the discovery of natural decidable fragments of rst-order
temporal logic will stimulate further research in this eld.
In this paper, we conne ourselves to considering satisability of temporal formulas
without equality or function symbols, interpreted in models with constant rst-order
domains and strictly linear ows of time: in particular, the aforementioned hN;<i,
hZ;<i, and hQ;<i. We are interested both in models with arbitrary domains and in
those with only nite domains. Actually, none of the decidable fragments to be con-
structed below has the nite domain property: the set of formulas (in these fragments)
satisable in arbitrary temporal models properly contains the set of formulas satisable
in models with nite domains. We show, however, that the decidability results men-
tioned above hold for the temporal logics (on hN;<i, hZ;<i, hR;<i, etc.) with nite
domains.
Our results also apply to two-sorted rst-order languages in which one sort is spe-
cially intended for talking about time. The predicate temporal language, ‘TL’, provides
only ‘implicit’ access to time: quantication over points in time in the sense of rst-
order logic is not permitted, and the only means of expressing temporal properties is by
the operators Since and Until. A common alternative is to reason about time explicitly,
using rst-order logic. Following this approach in the propositional case yields monadic
rst-order logic interpreted in strict linear orders, while in the predicate case it leads
to a two-sorted rst-order language, called ‘TS’ in what follows, one sort of which
refers to points in time and the other to the rst-order domain. The relation between
TL and TS has been investigated intensively in the context of temporal databases
(see, e.g. [2, 3, 12, 13]). In the propositional case, both languages are known to have
the same expressive power over most classes of ows of time { i.e., the temporal
propositional language is expressively complete, see [26, 16]. This turns out not to be
so in the rst-order case: the formula
9t19t2(t1<t2 ^ 8x(P(t1; x)$ P(t2; x)))
is not expressible in TL over any interesting class of ows of time [2, 3, 12, 27].
However, it remained open in the literature on temporal databases whether there is a
natural characterization of the fragment ofTS for whichTL is expressively complete.
We will show that a natural such fragment { called TS1t { consists of all formulas in
which ‘domain’ quantiers 8x are applied to formulas with at most one free temporal
variable (observe that this condition, approximately dual to monodicity, is violated in
the formula above). Moreover, the fragment TL1 of monodic TL-formulas turns out
to be expressively complete for the fragment TS1 of monodic TS1t-formulas. The
translation from TS1 into TL1 is eective, so all our decidability results for fragments
of TL1 carry over to the corresponding fragments of TS1.
We will give three dierent decidability proofs for monodic fragments. They all rely
on representing a temporal model satisfying a given monodic formula ’ in the form
of a ‘quasimodel’, the most important feature of which is that the size of its domain
is nitely bounded (in terms of ’). Our rst algorithm expresses the existence of a
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quasimodel satisfying such a ’ by a formula of monadic second-order logic. This fact,
together with the Buchi and Rabin decidability theorems, makes it possible to reduce
the satisability problem for monodic formulas in models based on hN;<i, hZ;<i,
hQ;<i, and some other linear temporal structures to the satisability problem for a cer-
tain fragment of classical rst-order logic. The complexity of the satisability-checking
algorithm supplied by such a reduction is non-elementary. To construct an algorithm
of better performance (at least for some ows of time) we investigate the structure
of quasimodels on hN;<i satisfying a given TL1-formula ’, and obtain a second,
more explicit and elementary satisability-checking algorithm for hN;<i, provided
of course that we have an ‘elementary’ oracle capable of deciding the satisability
problem for the classical rst-order formulas mentioned above. A modied algorithm
checks satisability in models with nite domains. Our third algorithm covers the ow
of time hR;<i in the nite-domain case, and is an adaptation of the second proof of
decidability of propositional temporal logic with Until and Since over hR;<i given
in [11].
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we dene the syntax and
semantics of the temporal logics under consideration and prove that their monadic two-
variable fragments are undecidable. We then introduce the fragment TL1 of monodic
formulas. In Section 3 we introduce quasimodels. In Section 4 we give our rst deci-
sion procedure for monodic formulas, using monadic second-order logic. In Section 5
we give the second one, and in Section 6 its modied form for nite domains. In
Section 7 we describe the third algorithm, for hR;<i in the nite-domain case. In Sec-
tion 8, we prove the expressive completeness of TL1 for TS1, and use the obtained
criteria to single out a number of decidable fragments of rst-order temporal logics,
including fragments of TS1, and the two-variable, monadic, and guarded monodic frag-
ments of TL1. We show also some applications to temporal epistemic and description
(propositional) logics. Finally, in Section 9, we list some open problems.
2. First-order temporal logic
Denote by TL the rst-order temporal language constructed in the standard way
from the following alphabet:
 predicate symbols P0; P1; : : : ; each of which is of some xed arity,
 individual variables x0; x1; : : : ;
 individual constants c0; c1; : : : ;
 the booleans ^; :;
 the universal quantier 8x for each individual variable x,
 the temporal operators S (Since) and U (Until).
The set of predicate symbols in TL is assumed to be non-empty. 0-ary predicates,
i.e., propositional variables, are denoted by p0; p1; : : : : We will assume that there is a
sucient supply of those variables, unary predicate symbols, and an innite set var of
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individual variables. L is the classical (non-temporal) rst-order language that results
from TL by omitting all formulas containing S or U.
We will use the following standard abbreviations:
9x’=:8x:’;
’=>U’;
’=::’;
+’=’ ^ ’;
+’=’_’;
©’=?U’:
TL is interpreted in rst-order temporal models of the form M= hF ; D; Ii, where
F = hW;<i, the underlying frame, is a strict linear order 1 representing the ow of
time, D is a non-empty set, the domain of M, and I is a function associating with
every moment of time w2W a rst-order L-structure
I(w)= hD; P I(w)0 ; : : : ; cI(w)0 ; : : :i;
the state of M at moment w, in which P I(w)i , for each i, is a predicate on D of the
same arity as Pi (for a propositional variable pi, the predicate p
I(w)
i is simply one of
the propositional constants >, ‘truth’, or ?, ‘falsehood’), and cI(w)i is an element of D.
We require that cI(w)i = c
I(v)
i for any w; v2W (‘rigid constants’). To simplify notation,
we will omit the superscript I and write Pwi , p
w
i , c
w
i , etc., if I is clear from the context.
An assignment in D is a function a from var to D. The truth-relation (M; w) j=a ’
(or simply w j=a ’, if M is understood) in the model M under the assignment a is
dened inductively in the usual way:
 w j=a Pi(y1; : : : ; y‘) i Pwi (a(y1); : : : ; a(y‘)) is true in I(w) (we write this also as
I(w) j=a Pi(y1; : : : ; y‘), or I(w) j= Pi [a(y1); : : : ; a(yl)], or indeed as (a (y1); : : : ;
a(yl))2P I(w)i );
 w j=a ’ ^  i w j=a ’ and w j=a  ;
 w j=a : i w 6j=a  ;
 w j=a 8x i w j=b  for every assignment b in D that may dier from a only on
x;
 w j=a ’S i there is v<w such that v j=a  and u j=a ’ for every u in the interval
(v; w)= fu2W : v<u<wg;
 w j=a ’U i there is v>w such that v j=a  and u j=a ’ for every u2 (w; v).
1 I.e., < is irreexive, transitive and 8x; y2W (x<y _ y<x _ x= y).
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It follows, in particular, that
 w j=a ’ i there is v>w such that v j=a ’;
 w j=a +’ i there is v>w such that v j=a ’;
 w j=a ’ i v j=a ’ for all v>w;
 w j=a +’ i v j=a ’ for all v>w;
 w j=a ©’ i there exists an immediate successor v of w (i.e., v>w and (w; v)= ;)
such that v j=a ’.
For a class F of strict linear orders, we let TL(F), ‘the temporal logic of F’,
denote the set of TL-formulas that are valid in F:
TL(F)= f’2TL: (M; w) j=a ’ for all M= hF ; D; Ii with F 2F;
all w2D; and all assignments a in Dg:
TLn(F) stands for the set of those TL-formulas that are valid in all models based
on linear orders in F and having nite domains. Instead of TL(fhN;<ig),
TLn(fhN;<ig) we write TL(N) and TLn(N), respectively; similar notation is used
for hZ;<i, hQ;<i, and hR;<i.
Remark 1. In this paper we consider only models with constant domains. Satisability
in models with expanding domains is known to be reducible to satisability in models
with constant domains (see [47]).
2.1. Undecidable fragments of TL
The following two theorems indicate some limits outside which one cannot hope to
nd decidable fragments of rst-order temporal logics.
For ‘<!, let TL‘ be the ‘-variable fragment of TL (i.e., every formula in TL‘
contains at most ‘ distinct individual variables). And by TLmo we denote the monadic
fragment of TL (i.e., the set of formulas which contain only unary predicates and
propositional variables).
Theorem 2. Let F be either fhN;<ig or fhZ;<ig. Then the set TL2 \TLmo \
TL(F) is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. We show this by reducing the recurrent tiling problem for N  N (which is
11-complete; see [24]) to the satisability problem for the monadic TL
2-formulas in
F. Recall that a tile t is a 1  1 square with xed orientation and coloured edges
right(t), left(t), up(t), and down(t). The NN recurrent tiling problem is formulated
as follows: given a nite set T of tiles and a tile t0 2T , determine whether there
is a tiling of N N by T such that t0 occurs innitely often in the rst row. More
precisely, the problem is to nd out whether there exists a function f from N  N
into T such that, for all m; n2N,
 right(f(n; m))= left(f(n+ 1; m)),
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 up(f(n; m))= down(f(n; m+ 1)),
 the set fn2N :f(n; 0)= t0g is innite.
With a given set T = ft0; : : : ; tng of tiles we associate unary predicates P0; : : : ; Pn.
We also require two unary predicates, Q1 and Q2, which will be used in the formula
R(x; y)=(Q1(x) ^ Q2(y)):
Now dene a rst-order temporal formula ’T in TL
2 \TLmo as the conjunction of
the following formulas:
9x (P0(x)^>);
8x9yR(x; y);
8x; y((R(x; y)!R(x; y)) ^ (:R(x; y)!:R(x; y)));
+8x
0@ n_
i=0
Pi(x) ^
^
i 6=j
(Pi(x)!:Pj(x))
1A ;
+8x; y
0@Pi(x) ^ R(x; y)! _
up(ti)=down(tj)
Pj(y)
1A ;
+8x
0@Pi(x)! © _
right(ti)=left(tj)
Pj(x)
1A :
Let us show that ’T is satisable in a model based on the frame in F i there is a
recurrent tiling of NN by T :
Suppose rst that f :NN!T denes a recurrent tiling. Put D=N,
P I(n)i = fm2D : f(n; m)= tig;
for n2N, and select for every i2N an innite set MiN such that Mi \ Mi0 = ;
whenever i 6= i0. Now put, for i2D and n2N, i2QI(n)1 and i + 12QI(n)2 i n2Mi.
Also specify that 0 =2 QI(n)2 . It should be clear that ’T is satised in hhN;<i; D; Ii. It
follows that ’T is satisable in F.
Conversely, suppose ’T is satised in a model M= hF ; D; Ii, for F 2F. Then
F = hW;<i contains an innite ascending chain, say 0; 1; 2; : : : such that 0 j=’T and
i+1 is the immediate successor of i. By the rst conjunct of ’T , we nd an a0 2D for
which 0 j=P0[a0] and the set fn2N : n j=P0[a0]g is innite. Let RI(n) = fha; bi 2D2 :
n j=(Q1 ^Q2)[a; b]g. According to the second conjunct, we have an R-ascending
chain a0RI(0)a1RI(0)a2 : : : of elements in D. By the third conjunct, for all n; i; j2N,
we have aiRI(n)aj i aiRI(0)aj. Now dene a function f by putting, for all i; j2N,
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f(i; j)= tk whenever i j=Pk [aj]. It is straightforward to check that f is a recurrent
tiling of NN.
It follows, in particular, that if F is any one of the classes mentioned in the for-
mulation of Theorem 2 then TL(F) is not recursively axiomatizable (cf. [16]).
Theorem 3. Let F be one of the following classes of temporal frames: fhN;<ig;
fhZ;<ig; the class of all strict linear orders. Then TL2 \TLmo \TLn(F) is not
recursively enumerable.
Proof. We are going to reduce the following undecidable problem to the satisfaction
problem for the monadic TL2-formulas in models with nite domains: given a Turing
machine, determine whether it comes to a stop having started from the empty tape.
Let A be a single-tape right-innite deterministic Turing machine with state space S,
initial state s0, halt state s1, tape alphabet A (b2A stands for blank) and transition
function . The congurations of A will be represented by innite words of the form
$a0 : : : ai : : : anb!, where $ marks the left side of the tape, all a0; : : : ; an save one,
say ai, are in A, while ai belongs to S  A and represents the active cell and the
current state. The start conguration, for instance, is represented by $(s0; b)b!. Let
A0=A[f$g[ (S  A), and A00=A0 n f$g.
We want to construct a monadic TL2-formula ’A which is satisable in a model
with a nite domain D (based on a frame in F) i A comes to a stop (i.e., reaches the
halt state) having started from $(s0; b)b!. Roughly, the idea is to codify congurations
of A by elements x2D using the behaviour of x over time.
First, with every 2A0 we associate a unary predicate P. The sentence
8x
0@P$(x) ^ _
2A00
0@P(x) ^ : _
 6=2A00
P(x)
1A1A (1)
means that ‘now’, all objects in D are in P$ while later each of them belongs to
precisely one of the sets P, for 2A00. To mark the object representing the active cell
of a given conguration and its immediate predecessor and successor, we use three
unary predicates, S, L, and R, dened by the formulas
+ 8x
0@S(x)$ _
(s; a)2A0
P(s; a)(x)
1A ; (2)
+ 8x((L(x)$©S(x)) ^ (S(x)$©R(x))); (3)
+ 8x:(S(x)^S(x)): (4)
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The transition from one conguration to another is simulated by means of the for-
mula:
(x; y) =
^
(; ; )=(0 ; 0 ; 0)
+(L(x)^P(x)^©(P(x)^© P(x)))
!+
 
(L(x)!P0(y)) ^ (S(x)! P0(y)) ^ (R(x)! P0(y))
^
^
2A0
(:L(x) ^ :S(x) ^ :R(x) ^ P(x)!P(y))
!
:
The following two formulas dene a unary predicate C (clock); its intended meaning
is to x the moment of time the machine reaches this or that conguration.
8x(+C(x) ^+:(C(x) ^C(x))); (5)
8x; y((x; y)! + (C(x) ^©C(y))): (6)
It remains only to ensure that there exists a sequence representing a halt congura-
tion:
9x+
_
(s1 ; a)2A0
P(s1 ; a)(x); (7)
and that each conguration save the start one on the empty tape has a predecessor:
8y(:(P$(y) ^©(P(s0 ; b)(y) ^Pb(y))!9x (x; y)): (8)
Let ’A be the conjunction of (1){(8) and the formula +©>, which ensures that
every moment of time (starting from the one satisfying this formula) has an immediate
successor. It is not hard to check that ’A is satised in a model with a nite domain
(based on a frame in F) i A comes to a stop having started from the empty tape.
Indeed, the ‘(’-part of the proof should be clear. For the converse, suppose that ’A
is satised in a world w of a model based on some linear order and having a nite
domain, D. By (7), (1), and (2){(4), there is h2D representing a halt conguration.
Observe that, by (5) and (6), we cannot have objects c0; : : : ; cn 2D such that c0 = cn
and w j= [c0; c1] ^    ^ [cn−1; cn]. Let c0; : : : ; cn be a maximal chain in D for which
cn= h and w j= [ci; ci+1], 06i<n. Such a chain exists since D is nite. So there
is no c2D with w j= [c; c0]. In view of (8), this can only mean that c0 represents
the start conguration on the empty tape. Thus, by denition of , A reaches a halt
conguration having started from the empty tape.
Thus, the set TL2 \TLmo \ TLn(F) is undecidable. On the other hand, its com-
plement (in the set of monadic TL-formulas) is recursively enumerable. For, it is not
hard to see that satisability of monadic and indeed arbitrary ML-formulas in mod-
els based in F and having domains of 6n elements, for xed n, can be reduced to
satisability of propositional temporal formulas in F, which is known to be decidable
(see e.g. [16]).
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2.2. Monodic formulas
Note that both undecidability proofs above use temporal formulas of the form ’U 
with two free variables. We now consider the ‘monodic’ fragment of TL without
formulas of that sort.
Denition 4 (monodic formulas). Denote by TL1 the set of all TL-formulas ’ such
that any subformula of ’ of the form  1U 2 or  1S 2 has at most one free variable.
Such formulas will be called monodic. In other words, monodic formulas allow quan-
tication into temporal contexts only with one free variable. From now on we will be
assuming that all our formulas are monodic.
For a set   of TL-formulas, denote by subn   the closure under negation of the
set of all subformulas of formulas in   containing 6n free variables; sub’ denotes
the set of all subformulas in a formula ’, and con’ the set of all constants in ’.
Without loss of generality, we may identify  and :: ; so subn   is nite whenever
  is nite. In what follows we will not be distinguishing between a nite set   of
formulas and the conjunction
V
  of formulas in it.
For every formula  (x)=’1U’2 or  (x)=’1S’2 with one free variable x, we
reserve a unary predicate P (x), and for every sentence  =’1U’2 or  =’1S’2 we
x a propositional variable p . P (x) and p are called the surrogates of  (x) and  ,
respectively.
Given a formula ’, we denote by ’ the formula that results from ’ by replacing
all its subformulas of the form  1U 2 and  1S 2 which are not within the scope of
another occurrence of U or S by their surrogates. Thus, ’ contains no occurrences of
temporal operators at all { i.e., it is an L-formula; we will call ’ the L-reduct of ’.
For a set   of TL1-formulas, we let  = f  :  2 g.
3. Codifying models
Imagine that we need to nd out whether a TL1-sentence ’ is satisable. Following
the motto ‘divide and conquer’, we separate the temporal and the pure rst-order parts
of TL1, focusing attention mainly on the former and pretending that we have a friend
who knows how to deal with the latter. We assume that this friend can obtain for us
an L-structure realizing any given set of subsets of sub’, if such a structure exists at
all. In this way, we build up a complete stock of such structures; one of them should
satisfy the L-reduct of ’. Our task is then to try to t these structures together into a
temporal model satisfying ’. When doing this, we need only take care of formulas of
the form  1U 2 and  1S 2 in sub’, relying upon our good friendship as far as other
formulas are concerned.
The aim of this section is to show that modulo’, every temporal model can be
codied in a structure called a quasimodel. A quasimodel may be viewed as a model
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in which the states have pairwise disjoint domains, each domain has a bounded number
of elements (depending on ’), and each domain element satises some specied set
of subformulas of ’. The correspondence between elements in dierent states will be
established by special functions called runs.
Let x be a variable not occurring in ’. Put
subx ’= f fx=yg :  (y)2 sub1 ’g:
Denition 5 (type). By a type for ’ we mean any boolean-saturated subset t of subx ’:
that is,
  ^ 2 t i  2 t and 2 t, for every  ^ 2 subx ’;
 : 2 t i  =2 t, for every  2 subx ’.
We say that two types t and t0 agree on sub0 ’ if t \ sub0 ’= t0 \ sub0 ’. Given a
type t for ’ and a constant c2 con’, the pair ht; ci will be called an indexed type for
’ (indexed by c) and denoted by tc(x) or simply tc.
There are only nitely many types for ’ { at most
[(’)= 2jsubx ’j;
to be more precise. To a certain extent, every state w in a model under a given
assignment can be characterized (modulo ’, of course) by the set of types that are
realized in this state and the set of types that hold on its constants. This motivates the
following denition.
Denition 6 (state candidate). Suppose that T is a set of types for ’ that agree on
sub0 ’, and Tcon= fht; ci : c2 con’g a set of indexed types such that ft : ht; ci 2Tcong
T . Then the pair C = hT; T coni is called a state candidate for ’.
Not all state candidates can represent states in temporal models. To single out those
that can, we require one more denition.
Denition 7 (realizable state candidate). Consider a rst-order L-structure
D= hD; PD0 ; : : : ; cD0 ; : : :i (9)
and suppose that a2D. The set
tD(a)= f 2 subx ’ :D j=  [a]g
is clearly a type for ’. Say that D realizes a state candidate hT; T coni if the following
conditions hold:
 T = ftD(a) : a2Dg,
 Tcon= fhtD(cD); ci : c2 con’g.
A state candidate is said to be nitely realizable if there exists a nite L-structure
realizing it.
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Denote by ](’) the number of distinct realizable state candidates for ’. It should
be clear that
](’)62[(’)  [(’)jcon ’j:
Lemma 8. A state candidate C = hT; T coni for ’ is ( nitely) realizable i the
L-formula
C =
 ^
t2T
9x t(x)
!
^
 
8x
_
t2T
t(x)
!
^
0@ ^
ht; ci2Tcon
t(c)
1A
is satised in some (respectively; nite) L-structure.
Proof. Follows immediately from the denitions.
Lemma 9. Let  be a cardinal; >@0. Then every realizable state candidate hT; T coni
is realized in an L-structure D of the form (9) such that; for every t 2T; the set
Dt = fa2D :D j= t [a]g
is of cardinality .
Proof. Follows from classical model theory, since the language L is countable and
does not contain equality.
We are now in a position to dene the central notion of this section, that of a
quasimodel. Let F = hW;<i be a linear order.
Denition 10 (state function). A state function for ’ over F is a map f associating
with each w2W a realizable state candidate f(w)= hTw; T conw i for ’.
Denition 11 (run). Let f be a state function for ’ over F = hW;<i, with f(w)=
hTw; T conw i for w2W . By a run in f we mean a function r from W into the setS
w2W Tw such that
 r(w)2Tw, for all w2W ,
 for every  1U 2 2 subx ’ and every w2W , we have  1U 2 2 r(w) i there is v>w
such that  2 2 r(v) and  1 2 r(u) for all u2 (w; v),
 for every  1S 2 2 subx ’ and every w2W , we have  1S 2 2 r(w) i there is v<w
such that  2 2 r(v) and  1 2 r(u) for all u2 (v; w).
Denition 12 (quasimodel). Suppose f is a state function for ’ over F and R a
set of runs in f. The pair m= hf;Ri is called a quasimodel for ’ (over F ) if the
following conditions hold:
 for every c2 con’, the function rc dened by rc(w)= t, for ht; ci 2Tconw ; w2W , is
a run in R,
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 for every w2W and every t 2Tw, there exists a run r 2R such that r(w)= t.
In this case the state candidates f(w) are called quasistates of m. Say that ’
is satised in the quasimodel m if there is w2W such that ’2 t, for some (or,
equivalently, all) t 2Tw.
Remark 13. Note that, for any two sets of runs R1 and R2 in f, if R1R2 and hf;R1i
is a quasimodel for ’ then hf;R2i is a quasimodel for ’ as well. Consequently, there
exists a quasimodel for ’ based on a state function f i hf;
fi is a quasimodel
for ’, where 
f is the set of all runs in f. If we are interested in satisability of
temporal formulas in arbitrary models then it is enough to consider quasimodels of the
form hf;
fi; to simplify notation, we will denote such quasimodels by f. To deal
with satisability in models with nite domains, we shall need quasimodels hf;Ri
with nite R.
Theorem 14. A TL1-sentence ’ is satisable in a model based on F = hW;<i i it
is satised in a quasimodel for ’ over F .
Proof. Suppose ’ is satised in a model M= hF ; D; Ii. For every w2W , dene
f(w)= hTw; T conw i by taking
twa = f 2 subx ’ : (M; w) j=a  g; where a2D and a(x)= a;
Tw = ftwa : a2Dg;
T conw = fhtwcI(w) ; ci : c2 con’g:
It is easy to see that for every a2D, the function r(w)= twa ; w2W , is a run in f.
Let R be the set of all such runs. Then hf;Ri is clearly a quasimodel satisfying ’.
Note that R is nite whenever D is nite.
Conversely, suppose that ’ is satised in a quasimodel f for ’ over F . Take a
cardinal >@0 exceeding the cardinality of the set 
f of all runs in f and put
D= fhr; i : r 2
f; <g:
Then for any w2W and any type t,
jfhr; i 2D : r(w)= tgj=

 if t 2Tw;
0 otherwise.
By Lemma 9, for every w2W there exists an L-structure I(w) with domain D real-
izing f(w) and such that cw = hrc; 0i, for every c2 con’, and
r(w)= f 2 subx ’ : I(w) j=  [hr; i]g (10)
for all r 2
f and <. Let M= hF ; D; Ii. We show by induction on  that for all
 2 sub’ and w2W , and any assignment a in D,
I(w) j=a  i (M; w) j=a  :
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The basis of induction { i.e., the case when  =Pi(x1; : : : ; x‘) { is clear; for then,  =  .
The induction step for  =  1 ^  2;  =: 1, and  =8x 1 follows by the induction
hypothesis from the obvious equations:
 1 ^  2 =  1 ^  2; : 1 =: 1; 8x 1 =8x 1:
Let  (y)= 1U2 and a(y)= hr; i. We then have  =P (y), so by (10) and the
induction hypothesis,
I(w) j=a P (y) i 1U2 2 r(w);
i 9v>w(2 2 r(v) & 8u2 (w; v)1 2 r(u));
i 9v>w(I(v) j=a 2 & 8u2 (w; v)I(u) j=a 1);
i 9v>w((M; v) j=a 2 & 8u2 (w; v)(M; u) j=a 1);
i (M; w) j=a 1U2:
The formula  (y)= 1S2 is considered analogously.
Since ’2 r(w) for some w2W , we must have also (M; w) j=’, as required.
4. Embedding into second-order monadic theories
We can now quickly deduce decidability results by translating into monadic second-
order logic the statement that a quasimodel satisfying ’ exists.
We will use some auxiliary formulas. Introduce a unary predicate variable R for
each  2 subx ’. If t is any type for ’, let
t(x)=
^
 2t
R (x) ^
^
 2(subx ’)nt
:R (x);
saying that the R (x) dene the type t at x. Also,  denotes the conjunction of the
two formulas
8x
^
 1U 22subx ’
(R 1U 2 (x)$ 9y(x<y ^ R 2 (y) ^ 8z(x<z<y!R 1 (z))));
8x
^
 1S 22subx ’
(R 1S 2 (x)$9y(y<x ^ R 2 (y) ^ 8z(y<z<x!R 1 (z))));
{ this says that the R (x) dene a run.
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Let  be the set of all realizable state candidates for ’, and Ps (s2) a unary
predicate variable. We now dene the monadic second-order sentence ’ as follows:
9
s2
Ps
0BBB@8x
2664_
s2
Ps(x) ^
^
s; s02
s 6=s0
:(Ps(x) ^ Ps0(x))
3775 ^ _
hT; T coni2
’2
S
T
9xPhT; T coni(x)
^
^
c2con ’
9
 2subx ’
R 
2664 ^ 8x ^
hT; T coni2
ht; ci2Tcon
(PhT; T coni(x)! t(x))
3775
^ 8x
^
hT; T coni2
t2T

PhT; T coni(x)! 9
 2subx ’
R ( ^ t(x))
1CCA :
If F = hW;<i is a linear order, then F j= ’ i there exist (possibly empty) subsets
PsW (s2) which partition W in such a way that the state function f :W !
dened by w2Pf(w), for all w2W , is a quasimodel for ’ in the sense of Remark 13:
the second line states that each constant of con’ denes a run coded by the R , and
the third line expresses the second condition of Denition 12. The last conjunct on the
rst line says that ’ is satised in this quasimodel. Hence, F j= ’ i ’ is satised in
a quasimodel for ’ over F .
Note that if  can be constructed from ’ by an algorithm, then so can ’.
We can now apply known facts on decidability of monadic second-order logic to
obtain decidability results for monodic fragments.
Theorem 15. Let TL0TL1 and suppose that there is an algorithm which is capable
of deciding; for any TL0-sentence ’; whether an arbitrarily-given state candidate for
’ is realizable. Let F be one of the following classes of ows of time:
1: fhN;<ig;
2: fhZ;<ig;
3: fhQ;<ig;
4: the class of all nite strict linear orders;
5: any rst-order-denable class of strict linear orders { for example; the class of
all linear orders.
Then the satisability problem for the TL0-sentences in F; and so the decision
problem for the fragment TL(F)\TL0; are decidable.
Proof. By assumption, the sentence ’ is constructible eectively from ’.
1. By Theorem 14, ’ is satisable in a model based on hN;<i i ’ is satised
in a quasimodel for ’ over hN;<i, i (by the foregoing) hN;<i j= ’. This last
statement is decidable, by a result of Buchi [10].
2. The case of hZ;<i is similar.
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3. The case of hQ;<i is again similar, except that the decidability of the problem
‘hQ;<i j= ’’ follows from Rabin’s theorem on the decidability of S2S [35].
4. As before, we see that ’ is satisable in a model based on a nite linear order i
’ is true in some nite linear order. As is well known, it follows from Buchi’s
theorem [10] that this last statement is decidable.
5. By considering the standard translation of ’ into two-sorted rst-order logic (see
Section 8.1) and applying the downward Lowenheim{Skolem{Tarski theorem, it can
be seen that ’ has a model with ow of time in F i it has a model with countable
ow of time in F. By Theorem 14, this holds i ’ is satised in a quasimodel for
’ over a countable order in F.
Let  be a formula of monadic second-order logic, and let P be a monadic
predicate variable not occurring in  . Dene the relativization  P of  to P, by
 P =  for atomic  ; (: )P =: P; ( 1^ 2)P =  P1 ^ P2 ; (8x )P =8x(P(x)!  P),
and (8Q )P =8Q P . Evidently, for any sentence  and any linear order F , we have
F j=9P(9xP(x) ^  P) i F 0 j=  for some (non-empty) suborder F 0 of F { the
intended interpretation of P is the domain of F 0.
Now any countable strict linear order is a sub-order of hQ;<i. Let  be a sentence
of linear order dening F. Then ’ (assumed not to involve P) is satisable in
some countable F 2F i
hQ;<i j=9P(9xP(x) ^ ( ^ ’)P):
By Rabin’s theorem, this last statement is decidable.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 16. A similar result for scattered orders (those not embedding hQ;<i) can
be obtained by combining these methods. A similar encoding will establish decidability
of fragments TLn(N)\TL0, for TL0 as in Theorem 15, using Theorem 29 below in
place of Theorem 14. This proves Theorem 26 below.
Various applications of Theorem 15 can be found in Section 8.
5. Satisability in hN ; <i: arbitrary models
The translation into monadic second-order logic given in the preceding section re-
duces the satisability problem for monodic sentences to decidable problems of high
computational complexity { for example, the complexity of monadic second-order logic
over hN;<i (that is, ‘S1S’) is itself non-elementary [36]. In this section we demon-
strate another way of proving decidability of fragments of linear temporal logics, which
is more direct, makes plain the structure of these models, and does yield an elementary
decision procedure, provided of course that determining the realizability of state can-
didates is elementary. For simplicity we will be considering here the logic TL(N) in
the language with only one temporal operator Until; it is easy to add Since if required.
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The idea is to show that every quasimodel satisfying a given TL1-formula ’ can be
converted into another quasimodel which also satises ’ and is based on a periodical
state function, with the period being of some bounded length. In the next section we
will use this idea to obtain a satisability criterion for TL1-formulas in models (on
hN;<i) with nite domains.
Fix a TL1-sentence ’.
We will use the following notation regarding certain sequences of elements, in par-
ticular, state functions f=f(0); f(1); : : : and runs r= r(0); r(1); : : : : Given a sequence
s= s(0); s(1); : : : and i>0, we denote by s6i and s>i the head s(0); : : : ; s(i) and the tail
s(i + 1); s(i + 2); : : : of s, respectively; s1  s2 denotes the concatenation of sequences
s1 and s2; jsj denotes the length of s, and
s!= s  s  s  : : : :
An innite subsequence g=f(n0); f(n1); : : : of a state function f for ’ will also be
understood as a state function for ’ dened by g(i)=f(ni), i2N.
Lemma 17. Let hf;Ri be a quasimodel for ’ such that f(n)=f(m) for some n<m.
Then hf6n  f>m;R6n R>mi is also a quasimodel for ’; where
R6n R>m= fr6n1  r>m2 : r1; r2 2R; r1(n)= r2(m)g:
Proof. It suces to observe that if r1 and r2 are runs in f and r1(n)= r2(m), then
r6n1  r>m2 is a run in f6n  f>m. Let us check, for instance, the ‘)’-condition for
 1U 2 2 subx ’. Suppose that  1U 2 2 r1(k) for some k6n. Then, since r1 is a run,
there is l>k such that  2 2 r1(l) and  1 2 r1(l0) for all l0 2 (k; l). If l6n then we are
done. Otherwise, when l>n, we have  1U 2 2 r1(n)= r2(m), and so are done again,
since r2 is a run.
Now, because hf;Ri is a quasimodel, for every r1 2R there is r2 2R such that
r1(n)= r2(m), and vice versa (swapping n; m). It now follows that hf6n f>m;R6n 
R>mi is a quasimodel for ’.
Denition 18. If g is a subsequence of f, and both hf;Ri and hg;Qi are quasimodels
for ’, then we call hg;Qi a subquasimodel of hf;Ri.
For instance, hf6n  f>m;R6n R>mi in the formulation of Lemma 17 is a sub-
quasimodel of hf;Ri.
Lemma 19. Every quasimodel f for ’ contains a subquasimodel f0=f1  f2 such
that jf1j6](’) and each quasistate in f2 occurs in this sequence innitely many
times.
Proof. If each f(n), for n2N, occurs innitely often in f then let f0=f=f2 (f1
is empty). Otherwise, we take n to be the maximal number such that f(n) 6=f(m),
for all m>n, and apply Lemma 17 to the quasimodel f deleting from its head f6n
all repeating quasistates, which yields us a subquasimodel f0=f1 f>n satisfying the
required properties.
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Denition 20. Suppose that f=f(0); f(1); : : : is a sequence of realizable state candi-
dates for ’ of the form f(i)= hTi; T coni i; r is a sequence of elements from Ti; i2N,
such that r(i)2Ti, and n2N. Suppose also that a formula  1U 2 2 subx(’) occurs
in r(n). Then we say that r realizes  1U 2 in m steps (starting from n), if there is
l2 (0; m) such that  2 2 r(n+ l) and  1 2 r(n+ k) for all k 2 (0; l).
Lemma 21. Let f=f1  f2 be a quasimodel for ’ (with quasistates of the form
hTi; T coni i for i2N) such that n= jf1j6](’) and each quasistate in f2 occurs in it
innitely often. Then f contains a subquasimodel of the form f1 f0 f>l2 ; for some
l>0; such that
(i) jf0j6jsubx ’j  ](’)  [2(’) + ](’);
(ii) for every t 2Tn there is a run r in f1 f0 f>l2 coming through t and realizing
all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 r(n) in jf0j steps ( for tc 2Tconn the run rc
realizes all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 rc(n) in jf0j steps);
(iii) f0(0)=f>l2 (0).
Proof. Suppose t 2Tn;  1U 2 2 t and r is a run in f through t, i.e., r(n)= t. Take the
minimal m>0 such that  2 2 r(n+m) and  1 2 r(n+k) for all k 2 (0; m). Assume now
that 0<i<j<m, r(n+ i)= r(n+ j) and f(n+ i)=f(n+ j). In view of Lemma 17,
f1 f6i2 f>j2 is a subquasimodel of f and r6n+i r>n+j is a run in it coming through
t 2Tn. It follows that we can construct a subquasimodel f1 f602 f3 of f and a run
r1 in it which comes through t 2Tn and realizes  1U 2 in m16[(’)  ](’) steps.
Then we consider another formula of the form  01U 
0
2 2 t and assume that it is
realized in m2>m1 steps in r1. Using Lemma 17 once again (and deleting repeating
quasistates in the interval f3(m1); : : : ; f3(m2)) we select a subquasimodel f1  f602 
f6m13  f4 of f and a run r2 through t 2Tn which realizes both  1U 2 and  01U 02 in
2  [(’)  ](’) steps.
Having analyzed all distinct formulas of the form  1U 2 in t 2Tn we obtain a
subquasimodel f1 f602 f0 f>k of f and a run r0 through t which realizes all such
formulas in m06jsubx ’j  [(’)  ](’) steps.
After that we consider in the same manner another type t0 2Tn. However this time
we can delete quasistates only after f0(m0), and so to realize in some run through t0 a
formula  1U 2 2 t0, we need again 6[(’)  ](’) new steps. Since jTnj6[(’), at most
jsubx ’j  [2(’)  ](’) quasistates are required to satisfy (ii).
Finally, not more than ](’) quasistates may be needed to comply with (iii).
Denition 22 (suitable pair). A pair t; t0 of types for ’ is called suitable if for every
 1U 2 2 subx ’,
 1U 2 2 t i either  2 2 t0 or  1 2 t0 and  1U 2 2 t0:
Lemma 23. Suppose that f1 and f2 are nite sequences of realizable state candidates
for ’ of length l1 and l2; respectively; and let
f=f1  f!2
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with f(n)= hTn; T conn i; n2N. Then f is a quasimodel for ’ whenever the following
conditions hold:
1: for every i; 06i6l1 + l2; and every ti 2Ti, there are ti−1 2Ti−1 (only if i>0) and
ti+1 2Ti+1 (only if i<l1 + l2) 2 such that the pairs ti−1; ti and ti; ti+1 are suitable;
2: for every i6l1 and every ti 2Ti; all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 ti are realized
in l1 + l2− i steps in some sequence ti; ti+1; : : : ; tl1+l2 in which ti+j 2Ti+j and every
pair of adjacent elements is suitable;
3: every pair of adjacent elements in t0c ; : : : ; t
l1+l2
c ; where t
i
c 2Tconi ; is suitable and; for
every i6l1; all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 ti are realized in this sequence in
l1 + l2 − i steps.
Proof. We have to show that there is a run coming through an arbitrarily given tn 2Tn,
for every n2N. If n6l1, then we rst use condition 1 to construct a sequence t0; : : : ; tn
such that ti 2Ti and every pair of adjacent elements in it is suitable. After that, in
accordance with condition 2, we continue this sequence to t0; : : : ; tn; : : : ; tl1+l2 in order
to realize all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 tn. Then we again use 2 to continue it to
t0; : : : ; tl1+l2 ; : : : ; t2(l1+l2), realizing all U-formulas in tl1+l2 . And so forth. The resulting
sequence is clearly a run in f.
If n>l1 then, using 1, we construct a sequence t0; : : : ; tn; : : : ; tm such that ti 2Ti,
every pair of adjacent elements in it is suitable and m= k(l1 + l2), for some k>1.
After that, by 2, we run on this sequence to
t0; : : : ; tn; : : : ; tm; : : : ; t(k+1)(l1+l2)
realizing all the U-formulas in tm, and so on, thus obtaining a run through tn.
Finally, we observe that the sequence
t0c ; : : : ; t
l1−1
c  (tl1c ; : : : ; tl1+l2−1c )!
is a run in f, for every c2 con’.
As a consequence of the two preceding lemmas we immediately obtain the following:
Theorem 24. A TL1-sentence ’ is satisable i there are two sequences f1 and f2
of realizable state candidates for ’ such that f1  f!2 satises conditions 1{3 of
Lemma 23; all state candidates in f1 are distinct (and so jf1j6](’));
jf2j6jsubx ’j  [2(’)  ](’) + ](’)
and ’2 t for all t 2T0.
Proof. By Theorem 14 and Lemmas 19, 21, ’ is satisable i ’ is true in the rst
quasistate of a quasimodel of the form f1 f0 f>l2 described in Lemma 21. It remains
to observe that f1  f!0 satises the conditions of Lemma 23.
2 Note that f(l1 + l2) =f(l1) =f2(0).
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Given two nite sequences f1 and f2 of state candidates for ’, we can eectively
check whether they satisfy conditions 1{3 of Lemma 23. The only missing thing to
make the criterion of Theorem 24 eective is therefore an algorithm for detecting
whether a given state candidate for ’ is realizable. Modulo such an (elementary)
algorithm, we obtain an (elementary) algorithm for deciding ’.
Now we extend the developed technique to obtain a similar satisability criterion in
models with nite domains.
6. Satisability in hN ; <i: nite domains
To begin with, let us observe that formulas in TL1 behave dierently in models
with arbitrary and nite domains.
For ‘>1, put TL‘1 =TL1 \TL‘.
Theorem 25. For every TL0TL11 \TLmo;
TLn(N)\TL0%TL(N)\TL0:
Proof. Let
’=  9x(P(x) ^ :(>SP(x))):
In English: ‘at every moment, someone starts to get old’ { or perhaps, ‘every day has
its dog’. Then ’2TL11 \TLmo, and it is readily checked that ’ is satised in the
model M= hhN;<i;N; Ii with
I(n)= hN; Pn= f0; : : : ; ngi;
but is false in all models with nite domains. Indeed, if we interpret  as ‘at all
times’, then in any model of ’ with linear ow of time W and domain D we have
jDj>jW j. Thus, :’2TLn(N)\TL0 and :’ =2TL(N)\TL0.
Our aim in this section is to prove the following analogue of Theorem 15(1):
Theorem 26. Let TL0TL1 and suppose that there is an algorithm which is capable
of deciding; for a TL0-sentence ’; whether an arbitrarily-given state candidate for
’ is nitely realizable. Then the satisability problem for TL0-formulas in models
with nite domains; and so the decision problem for the fragment TLn(N)\TL0;
are decidable.
To this end we will modify Theorem 24 to show that a TL1-sentence ’ is satised
in a model with a nite domain i there is a quasimodel based on a state function
f=f1  f!2 as in Theorem 24, f(n) being a nitely realizable state candidate for all
n2N, and the quasimodel having a nite set of runs R in it. The idea is to strengthen
conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 23 in such a way that sequences tl1 ; : : : ; tl1+l2 , realizing
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formulas of the form  1U 2, could be short-circuited, i.e., tl1+l2 = tl1 . Then we will be
able to compose innite runs of the form
t0; : : : ; tl1−1; htl1 ; : : : ; tl1+l2−1i!;
the number of which is clearly nite. Yet, there remains one more technical problem:
to ensure that we have enough runs, i.e., that every type in every quasistate lies on
some run. To solve it, we will need two kinds of sequences of types in quasistates:
one,
s2 = htl1 ; : : : tl1+l2−1i;
to realize U-formulas, and another one,
s3 = ht0l1 ; : : : t0l1+l2−1i;
to make sure that we have enough runs. The resulting runs will then have the forms
t0; : : : ; tl1−1; (s2  s3)! and t0; : : : ; tl1−1; (s3  s2)!:
Let us x a TL1-sentence ’ and an enumeration ht1; : : : ; tn’i of all types for ’; n’
6[(’).
The following claim is a ‘nite version’ of Lemma 9:
Lemma 27. There is m<! such that; for every nitely realizable state candidate
C = hT; T coni and every sequence hni : 0<i6n’i; in which ni=0 whenever ti =2T and
ni>m otherwise; C is realized in an L-structure D such that jDti j= ni; for every
i6n’.
Proof. Suppose that C1; : : : ;Ck are all distinct nitely realizable state candidates for
’ (so that k6](’)) and that Cj is nitely realized in Dj. Then it is enough to take
m= maxfjDjti j : 0<i6n’; 0<j6kg.
Denition 28. A quasimodel hf;Ri for ’ over a linear order F = hW;<i is said to
be nitary if f(w) is a nitely realizable state candidate for all w2W , and R is nite.
Now we can prove a nite analogue of Theorem 14; it holds for any linear ow of
time.
Theorem 29. A TL1-sentence ’ is satised in a model with a nite domain i it is
satised in a nitary quasimodel hf;Ri for ’.
Proof. The implication ()) was established in the proof of Theorem 14.
(() Suppose ’ is satised in a nitary quasimodel hf;Ri for ’, and let m be the
number supplied by Lemma 27. Dene the domain of the model to be constructed by
taking
D= fhr; i : r 2R; <mg:
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By Lemma 27, for every n2N there exists an L-structure I(n) with domain D real-
izing f(n) and such that cn= hrc; 0i, for every c2 con’, and
r(n)= f 2 subx ’ : I(n) j=  [hr; i]g
for all r 2R and <m. Let M= hD; Ii. In precisely the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 14 one can show that ’ is satised in M.
Let hf;Ri be a quasimodel for ’. Dene an equivalence relation R on N by taking
iR j i f(i)=f(j) and 8r 2R r(i)= r(j)
and denote by [n]R the R-equivalence class generated by n.
Besides, for each n2N, we dene one more equivalence relation nR on N by taking
inR j i f(i)=f(j) and
 for every r 2R there is r0 2R such that r(n)= r0(n) and r(i)= r0(j),
 for every r 2R there is r0 2R such that r(n)= r0(n) and r(j)= r0(i).
Lemma 30. For every n2N; the number of pairwise distinct nR-equivalence classes
does not exceed
\(’)= ](’)  222jsubx ’j :
Proof. Fix some n2N and dene a function i(k; l), for i2N, k; l6n’, by taking
i(k; l) =

1 if 9r 2R r(n)= tk & r(i)= tl;
0 otherwise:
We then have inR j i f(i)=f(j) and i(k; l)= j(k; l), for all k; l6n’. It remains
to observe that the number of functions from f1; : : : ; n’g2 into f0; 1g is 2n2’ .
The nite analogue of Lemma 19 we need is proved similarly to that lemma with
the help of Lemma 17.
Lemma 31. Every quasimodel hf;Ri for ’ with nite R contains a subquasimodel
hf1  f2;Qi with nite Q such that jf1j6](’) and [n]Q is innite, for every n>jf1j.
However, to prove a nite version of Lemma 21, a somewhat subtler deleting tech-
nique is required.
Lemma 32. Let hf;Ri be a quasimodel for ’; n<i<j; and inR j.
Then hf6i  f>j; Q=R6i n R>ji is also a quasimodel for ’; where
R6i n R>j = fr6i1  r>j2 : r1; r2 2R; r1(i)= r2(j); r1(n)= r2(n)g:
Moreover; for all n0>j; if nR n0 then nQ n0 − (j − i).
Proof. Follows immediately from the denition of inR j.
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Lemma 33. Let hf=f1  f2;Ri be a quasimodel for ’ (with quasistates having the
form hTi; T coni i) such that n= jf1j6](’); R is nite; and [m]R is innite for all m>n.
Then hf;Ri contains a subquasimodel of the form hf1 f0 f>l2 ;Qi; for some l>0;
such that Q is nite and
(i) jf0j6jsubx ’j  \(’)  222jsubx ’j + \(’);
(ii) for every t 2Tn there is a run r 2Q through t realizing all formulas of the form
 1U 2 2 r(n) in jf0j steps ( for tc 2Tconn the run rc realizes all formulas of the
form  1U 2 2 rc(n) in jf0j steps);
(iii) nQ jf1  f0j. 3
Proof. Suppose t 2Tn,  1U 2 2 t and r is a run in R through t. Then there exists
m>0 such that  2 2 r(n + m) and  1 2 r(n + k) for all k 2 (0; m). Assume now that
0<i<j<m, r(n+ i)= r(n+ j) and n+ inR n+ j. In view of Lemma 32, hf1 f6i2 
f>j2 ;Q0 =R
6n+inR>n+ji is a subquasimodel of hf;Ri, r6n+ir>n+j is a run through
t, and for all n0>n+ j we have nQ0 n0 − (j − i) whenever nR n0. Thus we obtain
a subquasimodel
hf1  f602  f3;Q0i;
of hf;Ri such that Q0 is nite, there is a run r1 2Q0 through t, realizing  1U 2 in
m162jsubx ’j  \(’) steps, and such that for all n0>n + m1 we have nQ0 n0 − (j − i)
whenever nR n0. In particular, [n]Q0 is innite.
After that we consider another formula  01U 
0
2 2 t and assume that it is realized
in m2>m1 steps in r1. Using Lemma 32 once again (and deleting quasistates in the
interval f3(m1); : : : ; f3(m2)) we construct a subquasimodel
hf1  f602  f6m13  f4;Q1i
of hf;Ri and a run r2 through t realizing both  1U 2 and  01U 02 in 2  2jsubx ’j  \(’)
steps, with [n]Q1 being innite.
Having analyzed all distinct formulas of the form  1U 2 in t we obtain a subquasi-
model
hf1  f612  f0;Q0i
of hf;Ri with nite Q0 and a run r0 2Q0 through t realizing all U-formulas in
m06jsubx ’j  2jsubx ’j  \(’) steps. The class [n]Q0 is innite.
Then we consider in the same manner another type t0 2Tn. However, this time we can
delete quasistates only after f0(m0). And so forth. Thus we arrive at a subquasimodel
hf1  f602  f00;Q00i;
of hf;Ri with nite Q00, innite [n]Q00 and such that all formulas of the form  1U 2
in all t 2Tn are realized by some r 2Q0 in 6jsubx ’j  \(’)  222jsubx ’j steps.
3 Note that f(n)=f0(0)=f>l2 (0)=f(jf1  f0j).
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Finally, we need at most \(’) new quasistates to comply with (iii).
We are in a position now to prove the nite analogue of Lemma 23.
Lemma 34. Suppose f1 and f2 are nite sequences of realizable state candidates for
’ of length l1 and l2; respectively; and let
f=f1  f!2
with f(n)= hTn; T conn i; for n2N. Suppose also that the following conditions hold:
1. for every i<l1 + l2 and every ti 2Ti; there is a sequence t0; : : : ; tl1+l2−1 of types
for ’ such that
1:1. tj 2Tj; for every j<l1 + l2;
1:2. the pair ti; ti+1 is suitable; for every i<l1 + l2 − 1;
1:3. the pair tl1+l2−1; tl1 is suitable;
2. for every i6l1 and every ti 2Ti; there is a sequence t0; : : : ; tl1+l2−1 such that
2:1. all formulas of the form  1U 2 are realized in l1 + l2 − i steps in t0; : : : ;
tl1+l2−1;
2:2. tj 2Tj; for j<l1 + l2;
2:3. every pair of adjacent types in the sequence is suitable;
2:4. the pair tl1+l2−1; tl1 is suitable.
3. all pairs of adjacent elements in t0c ; : : : ; t
l1+l2−1
c ; where t
i
c 2Tconi ; as well as the pair
tl1+l2−1c ; t
l1
c ; are suitable; and; for every i6l1; all formulas of the form  1U 2 2 ti
are realized in t0c ; : : : ; t
l1+l2−1
c in l1 + l2 − i steps.
Then there is a nite set R of runs in f such that hf;Ri is a quasimodel for ’.
Proof. We have to dene a nite set of runs R in f. Say that a sequence t0; : : : ; tl1+l2−1
is of type 1 (type 2) if it satises condition 1 (respectively, condition 2 for i= l1)
in the formulation of the lemma. Clearly, there are nitely many sequences of type 1,
and every sequence of type 2 is also a sequence of type 1.
Let R consist of all innite words of the form
s1  (s>l12  s>l13 )! and s1  (s>l13  s>l12 )!;
where s1, s3 are sequences of type 1 and s2 is a sequence of type 2 such that
 the pair s1(l1 + l2 − 1), s2(l1) is suitable and
 s2(l1)= s3(l1).
It is readily checked that every such word is a run in f and that hf;Ri is a
quasimodel for ’. Needless to say that R is nite.
Putting together the two preceding lemmas we obtain:
Theorem 35. ATL1-sentence ’ is satised in a model on hN;<i with a nite domain
i there are two sequences f1 and f2 of nitely realizable state candidates for ’
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such that f1  f!2 satises conditions 1{3 of Lemma 34; all state candidates in f1
are distinct (and so jf1j6](’));
jf2j6jsubx ’j  \(’)  222jsubx ’j + \(’)
and ’2 t; for all t 2T0.
The criterion of Theorem 26, reducing the satisability problem for TL0-formulas
in models with nite domains to the nite satisability problem for L-formulas of the
form C , follows immediately.
7. Satisability in hR ; <i: nite domains
Now we will present a third method of reducing decidability of monodic fragments
to classical decidability problems. We will consider only nite domains, with ow
of time the real numbers, hR;<i. (The decidability problems for nite domains over
an arbitrary rst-order denable class of ows and over hN;<i, hZ;<i, and hQ;<i
reduce to this case; see Corollary 37. The case of hR;<i with arbitrary domains
remains open.)
We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 36. Let TL0TL1 and suppose that there is an algorithm which is capable
of deciding; for any TL0-sentence ’; whether an arbitrarily-given state candidate for
’ is nitely realizable. Then it is decidable whether such a sentence ’ is satised
in a model with ow of time hR;<i and nite domain: that is; TLn(R) \TL0 is
decidable.
The proof will occupy most of this section. The method is model-theoretic, based on
that of [11, 23, 28]; see also [16, Chapter 6.9]. Very roughly, the idea of the proof is
as follows. By Theorem 29, we need only decide whether there is a nitary quasimodel
of a given sentence ’2TL0 with ow of time hR;<i. Such a quasimodel consists
of a nite set of runs over hR;<i, a ‘snapshot’ of the runs at any moment of time
giving a nitely realizable state candidate. Thus, the nitely realizable state candidate
gives an instantaneous description of the runs in the quasimodel. We will show how to
describe the runs over longer intervals of R, ranging from one-point intervals as above,
to the whole of R. We may decide whether each possible description of the runs is
satisable: for one-point intervals, using the algorithm deciding nite realizability of
state candidates, and for more complex ones by decomposing them into simpler parts
for which we can already decide satisability (cf. Lemma 46(2,4) below). We will
then show that a description of the runs on the whole of R can always be built up in
nitely many steps from instantaneous descriptions (nitely realizable state candidates)
{ cf. Lemma 46(3). Combining these ideas serves to prove Theorem 36; formally, the
theorem follows from Lemma 46.
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Decidability over various other ows of time or classes of ows of time reduce to
Theorem 36.
Corollary 37. Let TL0TL1 and suppose that there is an algorithm deciding; for
any TL0-sentence ’; whether an arbitrarily given state candidate for ’ is nitely
realizable. Then it is decidable whether a TL0-sentence is satised in a model with
nite domain and with any of the following (classes of ) ows of time:
1. hN;<i;
2. hZ;<i;
3. hQ;<i;
4. the class of all nite linear orders;
5. any rst-order-denable class of linear orders.
Proof. We prove part 1. Given ’, introduce a new propositional variable p, and dene
the TL1-sentence
=:(>Sp)^(>Up^:pS>^:pU>);
where  abbreviates  _>U _>S and  abbreviates :: . So  states that
p is bounded below, unbounded above, and that there is no accumulation point of p.
Clearly, the models of  with ow of time hR;<i are precisely those in which the
interpretation of p is isomorphic to hN;<i. Now dene the relativization ’p of the
temporal connectives in ’ to p, by induction in the usual way: p=  for atomic ,
(: )p=: p, ( 1 ^  2)p=  p1 ^  p2 , (8x )p=8x p, and ( 1U 2)p=(p!  p1 )U(p^
 p2 ), plus a similar clause for S. Then it is easily seen that ’ has a model with ow
of time hN;<i and nite domain i ^p^’p has a model with ow of time hR;<i
and nite domain. An algorithm to decide nite realizability of state candidates for ’
easily adapts to do the same for ^p^’p. This proves part 1.
Parts 2 and 4 of the corollary are proved by similar reductions. For part 5, we also
use the downward Lowenheim{Skolem{Tarski theorem (as in Theorem 15) and the
expressive completeness of U and S over hR;<i [26, 16]. Part 3 follows, because ’
has a model with dense ow of time without endpoints (a rst-order denable property)
i it has a model over hQ;<i. The details are left to the interested reader.
This gives an alternative proof of Theorem 26.
7.1. 3-theories
We begin our proof of Theorem 36 with the denitions needed to describe runs
over intervals of R. To simplify notation, we will frequently identify (notationally)
a structure with its domain: hence, we write W rather than F = hW;<i for a linear
order.
Let L’ denote the rst-order language (with equality, say, though it is immaterial for
our purposes) in the signature f<;R :  2 subx ’g, where the R are unary predicates.
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An L’-order is an L’-structure M = hW;RM :  2 subx ’i where W is a linear order
and the RM are subsets of W .
Denition 38 (3-theory). A 3-theory (in L’) is a set  of rst-order L’-sentences
of the form 3th(M)= f :  an L’-sentence of quantier depth at most 3, M j= g, for
some L’-order M .
Up to logical equivalence, there are nitely many 3-theories. Note that by denition,
any 3-theory has a model. Let T be the set of types for ’; recall that T is nite,
with jTj6[(’). If W is a linear order and r :W !T, dene the L’-order Mr to be
hW; fw2W :  2 r(w)g :  2 subx ’i:
That is, Mr has underlying order W , and Mr j=R (w) i  2 r(w), for w2W and
 2 subx ’. We let 3th(r) denote 3th(Mr).
Denition 39 (endpoints, degenerate). Let  be a 3-theory. We say that  has a left
endpoint if  ‘9x8y:(y<x), that  has a right endpoint if  ‘9x8y:(x<y), and we
say that  is degenerate if  ‘8xy:(x<y).
Let I be a linear order and Mi= hWi; Ri :  2 subx ’i (i2 I) be L’-orders. We writeP
i2I Mi for the L’-order M with underlying order W =
S
i2I Wi  fig, ordered lex-
icographically by hw; ii<hw0; ji i either i<j, or i= j and w<w0 in Wi, and with
M j=R (hw; ii) i Mi j=R (w), for hw; ii 2W and  2 subx ’. We write the underlying
order of M as
P
i2I Wi. When I = f0; 1g with 0<1, we write simply M0 + M1 and
W0 +W1.
A well-known Feferman{Vaught argument (see, e.g. [25, Theorem A.6.2]) shows that
if Mi; Ni (i2 I) are L’-orders and 3th(Mi)= 3th(Ni) for all i, then 3th(
P
i2I Mi)= 3th
(
P
i2I Ni). Hence, we may use the following notation. Let I be a linear order and for
each i2 I let i be a 3-theory. We write
P
i2I i for the unique 3-theory  such that
=3th(
P
i2I Mi) for any L’-orders Mi j= i (i2 I).
As with L’-orders, we write 0 + 1 when I = f0; 1g with 0<1.
7.2. Characters
Given a state function f for ’ over a linear order W (Denition 10), a run r in f
(Denition 11) is completely described by the L’-order Mr . The 3-theory 3th(r) does
not completely determine r, but it does carry a great deal of information about r. For
example, for an arbitrary function r :W !T with f(w)2Tw where f(w)= hTw; T conw i,
3th(r) determines whether r is a run in f, and whether ’2 r(w) for some w2W .
Moreover, 3-theories are nite syntactic objects and can be used in algorithms. So we
will use them to represent quasimodels.
We aim to decide satisability of ’ by deciding whether a (nitary) quasimodel for ’
exists. Such a quasimodel consists chiey of a set of runs, and it can be described by a
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set of 3-theories { simply the 3-theories of the runs in the quasimodel. The quasimodel
also contains distinguished runs associated with constants, so we will also distinguish
certain of the descriptive 3-theories. This leads us to the following denition.
Denition 40 (character).
1. A character is a pair hS; Sconi, where S is a set of 3-theories and Scon : con’! S
is a function. There are only nitely many characters.
2. A character hS; Sconi is said to have a left (right) endpoint if every 2 S has a left
(right) endpoint.
3. A character hS; Sconi is said to be degenerate if
 each 2 S is degenerate,
 for each 2 S, the set t= f 2 subx ’ :  ‘9xR (x)g is a type for ’,
 hft : 2 Sg; fhtScon(c); ci : c2 con’gi is a nitely realizable state candidate for ’.
A nitary quasimodel for ’ is formally a state function f on a linear order W , whose
values are nitely realizable state candidates, together with a nite set R of runs in f.
We may ‘restrict’ such a quasimodel to any suborder W 0 of W , by restricting f and the
runs in R to W 0. In general, such a restriction need not be a quasimodel (we will call
it a ‘pre-quasimodel’), but it still has a character associated with it in the same way
as for a full quasimodel, by taking the 3-theories of the restrictions of the runs to W 0.
The smallest possibility is when W 0 consists of a single point of W { the restriction
of the quasimodel to W 0 is then essentially a nitely realizable state candidate, and the
associated character is degenerate.
We aim to try to build a quasimodel for ’ from smaller pre-quasimodels which are
restrictions of it. These smaller pre-quasimodels are in turn built from even smaller
ones, and so on, leading eventually to one-point restrictions. We will calculate the
character of each successively larger pre-quasimodel from the characters of the next
smaller ones, starting from degenerate characters describing the one-point restrictions,
and stopping when the character tells us that we have a genuine quasimodel. The al-
lowed operations in building a pre-quasimodel from smaller ones are, roughly speaking:
concatenating two pre-quasimodels; iterating a xed pre-quasimodel ! times, forwards
or backwards; and merging nitely many pre-quasimodels together in a densely ordered
‘shue’. We note that these operations can in general be eected in more than one
way, so are non-deterministic, and that certain preconditions borrowed from [11] have
to be met in order to ensure that the nal quasimodel has order-type R.
Since we are representing pre-quasimodels by their characters, we need to calculate
the character of a pre-quasimodel resulting from smaller ones by these operations.
The following denition will allow us to do this. The building operations cited above
are represented by clauses (iv){(vii) in the denition. We should note that there can
be more than one pre-quasimodel with a given character, and given that the building
operations are also non-deterministic, the character of the resulting pre-quasimodel is
not uniquely determined by the characters of the smaller ones. Therefore, we dene
only a relation ‘’ between the ‘input’ and ‘output’ characters, not a function.
I. Hodkinson et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 106 (2000) 85{134 113
We will need the notion of a condensation of R: namely, a linear order hI;<i
where I is the set of equivalence classes of some equivalence relation on R whose
equivalence classes are convex, the ordering < on I being induced from the ordering
on R in the obvious way. For more information on condensations see, e.g. [39]
Denition 41 (; ). Let I be a linear order, and = hS; Sconi and i= hSi; Sconi i
(i2 I) be characters. We write  Pi2I i if
(i) for each c2 con’, Scon(c)= Pi2I Sconi (c),
(ii) for each 2 S there are i 2 Si (i2 I) such that =
P
i2I i,
(iii) for all i2 I and i 2 Si, there are j 2 Sj (j2 Infig) such that
P
j2I j 2 S.
We write  Pi2I i if one of the following holds:
(iv) I is a 2-element order, say f0; 1g with 0<1, either 0 has a right endpoint or 1
a left endpoint (not both), and   0 + 1,
(v) I = hN;<i, i= 0 for all i2N, 0 has either a left or a right endpoint (not
both), condition (i) above holds, and S = fPi2I i : i 2 S0; i= 0 for all i2 Ig.
(vi) As for (v) but with I = hN;>i.
(vii) I is a dense condensation of hR;<i without endpoints; conditions (i) and (ii)
above hold, and for all i2 I (so that i is a convex subset of R):
 i and i have a left and a right endpoint,
 i is a singleton subset of R i  ‘8xy:(x<y) for all 2 Si,
 for each 2 Si there are j 2 Sj (j2 I) with
P
j2I j 2 S, hj; ji= hi; i for
some j2 I , and for each j2 I , the set fk 2 I : hk ; ki= hj; jig is dense in I .
We will see later that the conditions for  Pi2I i are decidable.
7.3. Legal and perfect characters
We now dene those characters that are reachable from degenerate ones by nitely
many applications of Denition 41.
Denition 42 (legal character). Let  denote the smallest set of characters containing
all degenerate characters and such that if I is a linear order, i 2 for i2 I , and
 Pi2I i, then 2. A character  is said to be legal if 2.
We also dene those characters that may be descriptions of quasimodels.
Denition 43 (perfect character). A character = hS; Sconi is said to be perfect if for
every 2 S,
  ‘8x(R 1U 2 (x)$9y(x<y^R 2 (y)^8z(x<z<y!R 1 (z)))) for every  1U 2
2 subx ’,
  ‘8x(R 1S 2 (x)$9y(y<x^R 2 (y)^8z(y<z<x!R 1 (z)))) for every  1S 2
2 subx ’,
  ‘8x9y; z(y<x<z),
and for some 2 S we have  ‘9xR’(x).
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By an interval of R we mean a linear order whose domain is a non-empty convex
subset of R, the ordering on it being induced from hR;<i. We will often abuse nota-
tion by identifying the subset of R with the linear order. Note that up to isomorphism
there are just ve intervals of R, represented by [0; 1], [0; 1), (0; 1], (0; 1), and f0g.
Here and below, we use standard notation for intervals: [x; y)= fz 2R : x6z<yg if
x6y, etc.
Characters describe runs over some interval of a potential nitary quasimodel. We
now make this precise.
Denition 44 (pre-quasimodel). A pre-quasimodel is a triple p= hW;f;Ri, where W
is a linear order isomorphic to an interval of R, f is a state function for ’ over W ,
f(w)= hTw; T conw i is a nitely realizable state candidate for ’ for each w2W , and R
is a nite set of functions r :W !T, satisfying the conditions:
 r(w)2Tw for every r 2R, w2W ,
 for each c2 con’, the map rfc :W !T dened by rfc (w)= t, where ht; ci 2Tconw , is
in R,
 for each w2W and t 2Tw there is r 2R with r(w)= t.
Denition 45 (model of a character). Let p= hW;f;Ri be a pre-quasimodel for ’,
and let = hS; Sconi be a character. We write p j=  if
 3th(rfc )= Scon(c) for each c2 con’,
 f3th(r) : r 2Rg= S.
7.4. The main lemma
We will prove:
Lemma 46. 1. If  is a perfect character; p= hW;f;Ri is a pre-quasimodel; and
p j= ; then hf;Ri is a nitary quasimodel for ’ over W in which ’ is satised; and
W = hR;<i.
2. If  is a legal character; then there exists a pre-quasimodel p with p j= .
3. If hf;Ri is a nitary quasimodel for ’ over hR;<i in which ’ is satised; then
there is a legal perfect character  with hhR;<i; f;Ri j= .
4. Given an oracle that determines whether a given state candidate for ’ is nitely
realizable; it is decidable whether there exists a legal perfect character. The algorithm
is uniform in ’.
Theorem 29 and parts 1{3 of the lemma show that ’ has a model with ow of
time hR;<i and nite domain i there exists a perfect legal character. By part 4 of
the lemma, given TL0TL1 and an algorithm that decides for any sentence ’2TL0
whether a given state candidate for ’ is nitely realizable, it is decidable whether such
a character exists. Hence, Theorem 36 follows from Lemma 46.
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7.5. Proof of Lemma 46(1)
This is straightforward. Let = hS; Sconi be a perfect character, p= hW;f;Ri a pre-
quasimodel, and let p j= . Then by the denitions, R is nite, and if r 2R we have
3th(r)2 S and so r is a run in f. So m= hf;Ri is a nitary quasimodel for ’ over
W . Let 2 S be such that  ‘9xR’(x), and let r 2R satisfy 3th(r)= . Then clearly,
’2 r(w) for some w2W , so that ’ is satised in m. Since  ‘8x9yz(y<x<z), W is
isomorphic to an interval of R and has no endpoints, so we must have W = hR;<i.
7.6. Proof of Lemma 46(2)
Here, we prove the ‘soundness’ part of Lemma 46. (Some may wonder if it should
be called ‘completeness’.) We will show that if  is a legal character then there is
a pre-quasimodel p j= . By denition of , it suces to prove that this holds for
any degenerate , and that if I is a linear order, i (i2 I) are characters having pre-
quasimodels, and  Pi2I i, then p j=  for some pre-quasimodel p.
Let = hS; Sconi be a degenerate character. As in Denition 40, for 2 S let t= f 2
subx ’ :  ‘9xR (x)g, a type for ’. Let W be a one-point ordering with domain fwg,
dene f(w) to be the nitely realizable state candidate hft : 2 Sg; fhtScon(c); ci : c2
con’gi for ’, and for 2 S dene r :W !T by r(w)= t.
Observe that 3th(r)= . For, by denition of Mr , for every  2 subx ’ we have
Mr j=R (w) i  2 r(w) i  ‘ 9xR (x). As  ‘ 8xy:(x<y), we see that if N j= 
then N = Mr . Since such an N exists, we have Mr j= . Hence, 3th(r)= 3th(Mr)= .
As W is isomorphic to a (one-point) interval of R, p= hW;f; fr : 2 Sgi is evi-
dently a pre-quasimodel, and by the above, p j= .
For the inductive step, let I be a linear order and = hS; Sconi, i= hSi; Sconi i; pi=
hWi; fi;Rii characters and pre-quasimodels with pi j= i (for all i 2 I), and suppose that
 Pi2I i. We will dene a pre-quasimodel hW;f;Ri and show that hW;f;Ri j= .
Let W =
P
i2I Wi. We show rst that () W is isomorphic to an interval of R. If
I is the order 0<1, then our assumptions show that either W0 has a right endpoint
or W1 a left endpoint, and not both, so that () is clear. (For example, if W0 = [0; 1]
and W1 = (1; 2) then W = [0; 2), an interval of R.) If I = hN;<i, then each Wi has
a left (say) endpoint, so again,
P
i2I Wi is isomorphic to an interval of R; the case
I = hN;>i is similar. Finally, suppose that I is a dense condensation of R without end-
points whose elements have left and right endpoints. Then by denition of ; Wi = i
for each i2 I , so W = S I = R and () follows. All cases in the denition of  are
now covered, and we are done.
For any functions gi dened on Wi (i2 I), we write
P
i2I gi for the function g on
W dened by g(hw; ii)= gi(w).
Lemma 47. If ri :Wi!T (i2 I); then 3th(
P
i2I ri)=
P
i2I 3th(ri).
Proof. Write r for
P
i2I ri. By denition, 3th(r)= 3th(Mr) and 3th(ri)= 3th(Mri) for
each i 2 I . Clearly, Mr =
P
i2I Mri . So
P
i2I 3th(ri) is by denition 3th(r).
116 I. Hodkinson et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 106 (2000) 85{134
Dene a state function f=
P
i2I fi on W , and write f(w)= hTw; T conw i for w2W .
The denition of R will divide into cases according to the parts of the denition of ,
but in all cases we will arrange that each r 2R has the form Pi2I ri for some ri 2Ri
(i2 I), and that rfc 2R for each c2 con’. Given this much, we can already check that
r(w) 2 Tw for all r 2R; w 2 W; (11)
3th(rfc )= S
con(c): (12)
For (11), let hw; ii 2W and r= Pi2I ri 2R. Then fi(w)=f(hw; ii)= hThw; ii; T conhw; iii.
So as pi is a pre-quasimodel, r(hw; ii)= (
P
i2I ri)(hw; ii)= ri(w)2Thw; ii, as required.
For (12), as pi j= i for each i, we have 3th(rfic )= Sconi (c). By the denitions and
Lemma 47, we obtain
rfc =
X
i2I
rfic ;
3th(rfc )= 3th
 X
i2I
rfic
!
=
X
i2I
3th(rfic )=
X
i2I
Sconi (c)= S
con(c)2 S:
9>>>=>>>; (13)
Now we go through the cases of Denition 41, dening R and checking that p= hW;
f;Ri is a pre-quasimodel and p j= .
4. (I = f0; 1g) We dene R= fr0 + r1 : r0 2R0; r1 2R1; 3th(r0 + r1)2 Sg. This is
clearly nite, since R0, R1 are nite.
 By (13), rfc 2R.
 Let w2W and t 2Tw; we seek r 2R with r(w)= t. Let w= hw0; ii for w0 2Wi,
i2 I . As pi is a pre-quasimodel, there is ri 2Ri with ri(w0)= t. As pi j= i;
3th(ri)= i 2 Si. As   0 + 1, there is 1−i 2 S1−i with 0 + 1 2 S, and
as p1−i j= 1−i, there is r1−i 2R1−i with 3th(r1−i)= 1−i. Then by Lemma 47,
r= r0 + r1 satises
3th(r)= 3th(r0 + r1)= 3th(r0) + 3th(r1)= 0 + 1 2 S;
so clearly, r 2R and r(w)= ri(w0)= t.
 To prove S = f3th(r) : r 2Rg, we only need check ‘’ { that if 2 S then there
is r 2R with =3th(r). By condition (ii) of Denition 41, there are i 2 Si
(i=0; 1) with = 0 +1, and since pi j= i, there are ri 2Ri with 3th(ri)= i,
for each i. We may take r= r0 + r1.
5. (I = hN;<i) We may assume that pi= p0 for all i2 I , since i= 0. We dene
R=
(
r : r=
X
i2I
ri for some ri 2Ri (i2 I); ri= r0 for all i; 3th(r)2 S
)
:
Clearly, jRj  jR0j, so R is nite.
 If c2 con’ then rfic = rf0c for all i2 I , since pi= p0. It now follows from (13)
that rfc 2R.
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 We let w2W and t 2Tw and nd r 2R with r(w)= t. Suppose that w=
hw0; ni, for w0 2Wn, n2N. As pn is a pre-quasimodel, we may pick rn 2Rn with
rn(w0)= t. As pn j= n, 3th(rn)2 Sn. Dene ri= rn for all i2 I . Then by denition
of , 3th(Pi2I ri)= Pi2I 3th(ri)2 S, so r= Pi2I ri 2R and r(w)= rn(w0)= t.
 By denition of , each 2 S has the form Pi2I i for i 2 Si (i2 I) with all
i equal to 0. By p0 j= 0, there is r0 2R0 with 3th(r0)= 0. Let ri= r0, for
each i, and r=
P
i2I ri. Then 3th(r)= , so r 2R. Hence, S f3th(r) : r 2Rg,
and the converse inclusion is clear by denition of R.
6. (I = hN;>i) This is similar to the preceding case.
7. (I is a dense condensation of R) This is the most involved case. Again, we may
as well suppose that if i= j then pi= pj, for i; j2 I . The denition of R has
two parts. First, observe that by Denition 41(ii), for each 2 S there are i 2 Si
(i2 I) such that = Pi2I i. For each i, pick ri 2Ri with 3th(ri)= i, and let
r=
P
i2I ri. Next, noting that it follows from the denition of  that for each
character , the set I= fi 2 I : i= g is either empty or dense in I , choose an
equivalence relation  on I with the properties:
() 8i; j2 (i  j ) i= j),
for all i2I; Ii is partitioned by  into jSij equivalence classes, each dense in I .
If ri 2Ri for i2 I , the sequence (ri)i2 I is said to be simple if i j implies
ri= rj, for all i; j2 I . Note that there are only nitely many simple sequences.
We let
R= fr : 2 Sg[
(X
i2I
ri : (ri)i2 I a simple sequence, 3th
 X
i2I
ri
!
2 S
)
:
 Observe that if c2 con’ then by (), (rfic )i2I is simple, so by (13) as before,
rfc 2R.
 Since by Lemma 47, 3th(r)= 2 S, we have S = f3th(r) : r 2Rg.
 Let hw; ji 2W , and t 2Tw. We seek r 2R with r(hw; ji)= t. As pj is a pre-
quasimodel, we may pick rj 2Rj with rj(w)= t. By Denition 41(vii), there
are i 2 Si for i2 I such that
P
i2I i 2 S, hi; ii= hj; 3th(rj)i for some i 2 I ,
and (y) fk 2 I : hk ; ki= hi; iig is dense in I for each i2 I . We may therefore
choose a new equivalence relation 0 on I satisfying the conditions (), such
that if i 0 i0 then i= i0 . So, writing i=0 for the 0-class of i (and similarly
for ), we may dene i=0 to be i, for i2 I . Let I= denote the set of
-classes contained in I, and dene I=0 similarly. By (), jI= j= jI=0j
for every , and we know that 3th(rj)= e for some e2 Ij =0. Since j2 Ij ,
we may pick a bijection  : I= ! I=0 such that
(a) (I= )= I=0, for all characters ,
(b) (j= )= e, so that ( j= ) = 3th(rj).
Now pick ri 2Ri for each i2 I nfjg in such a way that 8i2 I(3th(ri)= (i= ) 2
Si) and 8i; k 2 I (i  k ) ri= rk). Thus, the sequence (ri)i2I is simple. For ev-
ery i2 I , the set fk 2 I : hk ; 3th(rk)i= hi; 3th(ri)ig contains i= , so by ()
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it is dense in I . We saw that an analogous property (y) holds for (i)i2I . A
Feferman{Vaught argument (cf. [25, Theorem A.6.2]) now shows thatP
i2I 3th(ri)=
P
i2I i 2 S. Hence, r=
P
i2I ri 2R, and r(hw; ji)= rj(w)= t.
Remark 48. This part of the argument seems to fail in the arbitrary-domain case {
there is no obvious analogue for the last, density condition of Denition 41(vii) in that
case. This does not necessarily mean that the nite-domain case is ‘easier’, as opposed
to ‘dierent’. We conjecture that the argument of the rst-half of [11] may apply in
arbitrary domains.
7.7. Proof of Lemma 46(3)
The argument is very similar to one in [11]. Let m= hf;Ri be a nitary quasimodel
for ’ over hR;<i in which ’ is satised. For any interval E of R, we write mE
for hE; fE; frE : r 2Rgi; note that mE is a pre-quasimodel. We write E for the
character
E = hf3th(rE) : r 2Rg; (c 7! 3th(rfc E))c2con ’i:
It is clear that mE j= E for all E, and that R is perfect. We are going to show that
R is legal.
Lemma 49. Let I be a linear order and let Ei be an interval of R for each i2 I; such
that E=
S
i2I Ei is also an interval of R; and x<y whenever i<j in I; x2Ei; and
y2Ej. Then
1: 3th(rE)=
P
i2I 3th(rEi) for each r 2R;
2: E 
P
i2I Ei .
Proof. Let r 2R. Then by denition, 3th(rE)= 3th(MrE) and 3th(rEi)= 3th(MrEi)
for each i. Clearly, MrE =
P
i2I MrEi . So
P
i2I 3th(rEi) is by denition 3th(rE).
We now check that E 
P
i2I Ei . Let E = hS; Sconi, and Ei = hSi; Sconi i for i2 I .
If c 2 con’, then by denition, Scon(c)= 3th(rfc E) and Sconi (c)= 3th(rfc Ei) for i2 I .
Of course, rfc 2R. By part 1, we conclude that Scon(c)=
P
i2I S
con
i (c).
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Denition 41 follow easily from the fact that
S = f3th(rE) : r 2Rg=
(X
i2I
3th(rEi) : r 2R
)
: (14)
Denition 50 (good interval). We say that an interval E of R is good if E is legal.
Lemma 51. Any one-point interval of R is good.
Proof. Let E be such, with domain feg; we claim that E = hS; Sconi, say, is degener-
ate. Each 2 S has the form 3th(rE) for some r 2R. Then MrE j=8xy:(x<y), so
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=3th(MrE) is degenerate. Further,
t= f 2 subx ’ :  ‘ 9xR (x)g= f 2 subx ’ :MrE j=R (e)g= r(e);
a type for ’. As m is a nitary quasimodel for ’,
hft : 2 Sg; fhtScon(c); ci : c2 con’gi
= hfr(e) : r 2Rg; fhrfc (e); ci : c2 con’gi=f(e);
a nitely realizable state candidate for ’.
Lemma 52. Assume the conditions of Lemma 49; that I = f0; 1g with 0<1; and that
E0 and E1 are good. Then E is good too.
Proof. It suces to prove that E  E0 + E1 .
As E is an interval of R, either E0 has a right endpoint or E1 a left endpoint. Assume
the former; the other case is similar. If r 2R then by denition, 3th(rE0)= 3th(MrE0 ),
so as MrE0 j=9x8y:(x<y), 3th(rE0) ‘ 9x8y:(x<y). Hence, E0 has a right end-
point. Similarly E1 has no left endpoint.
By Lemma 49(2), E  E0 + E1 , and we conclude that E  E0 + E1 .
Lemma 53. Again assume the conditions of Lemma 49; that I 2fhN;<i; hN;>i;
hZ;<ig; and that every Ei (i2 I) is good. Then E is good.
Proof. We only consider the case I = hN;<i; the case hN;>i is similar, and hZ;<i
is handled using hN;>i, hN;<i, and Lemma 52. For i<j in N, write Eij for the
interval
S
i6k<j Ek of R. By Lemma 52 and induction on j− i, Eij is good. There are
only nitely many characters, so by Ramsey’s theorem [37], there is innite X N
such that Eij is constant for all i<j in X . Let x2X be minimal. As E0; x is good, by
Lemma 52 it suces to prove that
S
i>x Ei is good. Therefore, by renaming, we may
assume that Eij is constant for all i<j in N. As R is nite, we may further assume
(by Ramsey’s theorem) that for each r 2R; 3th(rEij) is the same for all i<j in N.
We will show that E 
P
i2I Ei .
We know that Ei = E0 for all i2 I . Since E0; E1 are disjoint convex subsets of R
whose union is convex, either E0 has a right endpoint or E1 a left endpoint { and not
both. It follows as in Lemma 49 that E0 has either a left or right endpoint.
Let E = hS; Sconi and Ei = hSi; Sconi i for i2 I , as usual.
 By Lemma 49, Scon(c)= 3th(rfc E)=
P
i2I 3th(r
f
c Ei)=
P
i2I S
con
i (c) for each c2
con’.
 S = fPi2I i : i 2 S0; i= 0 for all i2 Ig is true because (14) holds, and by the
above, 3th(rEi)= 3th(rE0) for each r 2R; i2 I .
Now Denition 41(v) gives E 
P
i2I Ei . Since the Ei are assumed legal, so is
E , and we conclude that E is good.
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Denition 54. We dene a binary relation  on R by xy i x=y, or x<y and
every convex subset contained in [x; y] is good, or y<x and every convex subset
contained in [y; x] is good.
Lemma 55.  is an equivalence relation on W; and any -class is itself an interval
of R.
Proof. Only transitivity needs a proof. Assume that xy z in R; we check that
x z. There are various cases, depending on the order-type of x; y; z. If x<z<y, it
is clear. Assume that x<y<z, let E be a convex subset of [x; z]; E0 =E \ [x; y), and
E1 =E \ [y; z]. If either E0 or E1 is empty, then certainly E is good. Otherwise, we
are in the situation of Lemma 52, so again E is good. The other cases are similar.
Hence, x z, as required.
It is clear by denition that any -class is convex.
Lemma 56. Any subinterval E of any -class is good.
Proof. There are four cases, depending on the endpoints of E. If E= [x; y] for some
x<y in R, then xy and the result is trivial. Assume that E has a left-hand endpoint
x0 but no right-hand endpoint. Choose an increasing sequence x0<x1<    in E, of
order type hN;<i and unbounded in E, and let Ei= [xi; xi+1). Since xi xi+1, Ei is
good. Now we are in the situation of Lemma 53, and we conclude that E is good. The
other two cases, when E has no left-hand endpoint, can be covered using the cases
hN;>i and hZ;<i of Lemma 53.
Lemma 57. Each -class is a closed interval of R.
Proof. Let E be a -class, and suppose that E has a least upper bound b 2 R. We
show that b2E. Take e2E, and any interval D of R with D [e; b]. Lemma 56
shows that D\E is good. If DE, we are done. Otherwise, D=(D\E)[fbg, and
Lemmas 51, 52, and 56 show that D is good. So b e and b2E.
Similarly, E contains any greatest lower bound for it. So it is closed.
We aim to show that R is a single -class. To this end, assume not: so the conden-
sation C =R= given by  has at least two elements. Because R is dense, Lemma 57
now shows that C is a dense ordering. Enumerate R as hrn : n<N i, and choose an
open interval I of C such that the nite set
fhE; 3th(rnE) : n<N i :E 2 Ig;
has least possible cardinality. It follows that for each open interval J  I and each
sequence = h; n : n<N i of a character and N 3-theories, fE 2 J : hE; 3th(rnE) :
n<N i= g is empty or dense in J .
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It can now be seen that S J PE2J E by dint of Denition 41(vii). Certainly, J
is isomorphic to a dense condensation of hR;<i without endpoints. By Lemma 49(2),
conditions (i) and (ii) hold. By Lemma 57, each E 2 J has a right and a left endpoint,
and since if r 2R and E 2 J then MrE j=3th(rE) and the underlying order of MrE
is E, E has left and right endpoints too. Similarly, jEj=1 i 3th(rE) ‘ 8xy:(x<y)
for all r 2R. The last part of Denition 41(vii) holds because for any r 2R and E 2 J ,
fE0 2 J : hE0 ; 3th(rE0)i= hE; 3th(rE)ig is dense in J .
So
S
J is good. By Lemma 56, each E 2 J is good, and Lemma 52 now shows that
if J is any subinterval of I then
S
J is good.
Take x<y in
S
I with x 6y. So there is an interval X  [x; y] that is no good. Let
X = fE 2 I :EX g. Then X is a subinterval of I , so S X is good. Let X<= fz 2X :
z<v for all v2S X g, and dene X> similarly. By Lemma 56, X< and X> are good.
We have X =X< +
S X + X>, so by Lemma 52, X is itself good, a contradiction.
Hence indeed, R is a single -class, so is good { R is legal. This completes the
proof.
7.8. Proof of Lemma 46(4)
Assume that we have an oracle telling whether a given state candidate for ’ is
nitely realizable. We show how to use it to decide whether there exists a legal perfect
character. The decision procedure is uniform in ’. Our method is to reduce the problem
to the satisability of certain existential monadic second-order sentences in hR;<i.
By [11, Theorem 2.9(d)], such problems are decidable. This reduction is quite quick
to present, avoiding several semantic subtleties, but since [11] uses much the same
methods as here, it is a very convoluted way of obtaining decidability. It is easy but
tedious to give a more direct algorithm.
Recall that up to logical equivalence there are nitely many 3-theories. Indeed, we
may easily construct from ’ a nite set T of L’-sentences of quantier depth at
most 3, closed under single negations and containing every such sentence up to logical
equivalence, and in particular containing the sentences 9x8y:(y<x), 9x8y:(x<y),
8xy:(x<y), and 9 xR (x) for  2 subx ’, and their negations. Any 3-theory can be
taken to be a certain subset of T , and a character a pair hS; Sconi where S }T (}
denotes the power set) and Scon : con’! S.
Note that not every such object is a 3-theory (or character). Nonetheless, we have:
Lemma 58. Given T and = hS; Sconi where S }T and Scon : con’! S; it is
decidable whether  is a 3-theory and  is a character.
Proof. T is a 3-theory i it contains every sentence in T or its negation, and the
sentence 9 2subx ’R 
V
 is true in some linear order. Hence, by the decidability of the
universal monadic second-order theory of linear order [22, 11], it is decidable whether
 is a 3-theory or not. Therefore, whether  is a character is also decidable.
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By this result, it suces to show that it is decidable (using the oracle) whether a
given character is legal or perfect. We can decide by inspection whether a character is
perfect. For legality, there are two parts.
Lemma 59. Given S }T and Scon : con’! S; it is decidable (using the oracle)
whether = hS; Sconi is a degenerate character.
Proof. We simply check that  is a character and that each 2 S contains 8xy:(x<y).
Then we check by inspection (cf. Denition 5) that for each 2 S, the set t= f 2
subx ’ :9 xR (x)2 g is a type for ’. Finally, we check with the oracle that hft :2Sg;
fhtScon(c); ci : c2 con’gi is a nitely realizable state candidate for ’.  is a degenerate
character i all these checks succeed.
Lemma 60. Let S be a set of characters and  be a character. It is decidable whether
there exist a linear order I and characters i 2S (i2 I) such that  
P
i2I i.
Proof. We refer to Denition 41. We can certainly decide whether a character has a
left or right endpoint. For the remainder, we need some notation. If (x) is a rst-
order formula with x and perhaps other variables free, and  is a rst-order formula,
we dene the relativization (x) of  to (x) in the usual way, by rst renaming
variables of  so that they do not occur in , and then setting =  for atomic ,
(^ 0)=  ^ 0, (:)=:, and (9y)=9y((y=x)^ ). We will always use
the variable x for relativization, and  will always be a sentence, so that it is harmless
to rename its variables. We note that any 3-theory  is satisable in a countable L’-
order, and that any countable linear order embeds in hR;<i. Hence, if P is a new
unary predicate, P(x) is true in some expansion of hR;<i interpreting the symbols of
L’ [ fPg.
Now we go through the cases in Denition 41 once more.
4. (I = f0; 1g) Introduce new unary predicates P0; P1. For 3-theories ; 0; 1, we have
= 0 +1 i the conjunction of the following sentences is true in some expansion
of hR;<i : (V 0)P0(x), (V 1)P1(x), (V )P0_P1(x), Vi<2 9xPi(x), and 8xy(P0(x)^
P1(y)! x<y). By the result of [11] already mentioned, this is decidable. The
denition of   0 + 1 is a boolean combination of such conditions, and is
therefore decidable. So we can decide whether   0 + 1 for some 0; 1 2S, by
considering all of the nitely many possibilities for 0; 1.
5. (I = hN;<i) Let P;Q be new unary predicates and let  be the conjunction of the
sentences 8x:(P(x)^Q(x)), 9x(Q(x)^8y<x(:P(y)^:Q(y))), 8x9y>xQ(y),
8x9y<x8z 2 (y; x):Q(z), 8x9y>x8z 2 (x; y):Q(z), and 8x9y>xP(x). An expan-
sion of hR;<i is a model of  i (the interpretations of) P;Q are disjoint and
unbounded above in R, Q has order type hN;<i, and there is no P before the rst
Q. Let (x; y) be the formula P(x)^8z((x6z6y _ y6z6x)!:Q(z)).
Let ; i (i2 I) be 3-theories with i= 0 for all i. Then =
P
i2I i i the con-
junction of the following sentences is true in some expansion of hR;<i : , P(x),
I. Hodkinson et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 106 (2000) 85{134 123
and 8y(P(y)! (0)(x;y)) (relativizing on x as said before). This statement is de-
cidable, so given characters , 0 = 1 =   , we can check eectively whether
Scon(c)=
P
i2I S
con
i (c) for all c2 con’ and whether S = f
P
i2I i : i 2 Si; i= 0
for all ig. Thus, whether  Pi2I i for some 0 = 1 =    in S is decidable.
6. (I = hN;>i) This is no dierent.
7. (I is a dense condensation of R) We will need to make copies Ls of the signature
L’= f<;R :  2 subx’g, for various objects s, by renaming the symbols R . We
assume that if s 6= t then Ls \Lt consists of just the symbol < for the order. If
Ls is such a copy, and  is an L’-sentence, we write Ls for the result of replacing
the relation symbols of L’ in  by the corresponding ones in Ls.
For a unary predicate P, we let (x; y; P) be 8z((x6z6y _ y6z6x)!P(z)).
Let f0; : : : ; n−1g be a set of characters, with n  2, and let = hS; Sconi be
another character. Write i= hSi; Sconi i, as usual. Introduce new unary predicates Xi
(i<n), and consider the following sentences :
 8xWi<n(Xi(x)^ Vj 6=i :Xj(x)),
 Vi<n 8x9yz(y<x<z ^Xi(y)^Xi(z)),
 8xyVi 6=j(x<y^Xi(x)^Xj(y)! Vk<n 9z 2 (x; y)Xk(z)).
These three say that the condensation given by ‘xy i Wi<n (x; y; Xi)’ is dense
without endpoints, and indeed that the classes included in any Xi occur densely.
 For each c2 con’, take a copy Lc of L’ and add the sentences (
V
Scon(c))Lc
and 8y(Xi(y)! (
V
Sconi (c))
(x; y; Xi)
Lc
) for each i<n.
 For each 2 S, take a copy L of L’, and add the sentences (
V
)L and
8yVi<n (Xi(y)! Wi2Si(V i)(x; y; Xi)L ).
 Finally, for each = hj; i where j<n and 2 Sj, introduce new unary predicates
Q; i; 0 for i<n and 0 2 Si, and add the sentences:
 ‘The Q;i;0 are pairwise disjoint’,
 Vi<n 8x(Xi(x)$ W02Si Q; i; 0(x)),
 (9xQ(x))!8xy(x<y^Q0(x)^Q00(y)!9z 2 (x; y)Q(z)), for any three
triples ; 0; 00 of the form h; i; 0i for xed  as above and with 0 6= 00,
 8y(Q; i; 0(y)! (
V
0)
(x; y;Q; i; 0 )
L
), for each i; 0,
 W2S(V )L .
It is not so hard to check that the conjunction of these sentences is true in
some expansion of hR;<i i   Pi2I i, where I is a condensation of hR;<i,
fi : i 2 Ig = f0; : : : ; n−1g, and the provisions of Denition 41(vii) are met. Hence,
as before, it is decidable whether   Pi2I i via Denition 41(vii) for some
i 2S.
Now we decide whether a character  is legal as follows. Build the set 0 of all
degenerate characters, using Lemmas 58 and 59. Given n, check for each character
 =2n whether  
P
i2I i for some linear order I and some i 2n, using Lemma 60.
If so, put  in n+1. Include n in n+1. Increment n, and repeat. Terminate when
n+1 =n, and check whether 2n. This determines whether  is legal, and com-
pletes the proof of Lemma 46 and Theorem 36.
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8. Applications
In this section, we apply the conditional decidability criteria obtained above in order
to single out a number of decidable fragments of various temporal logics. We begin by
discussing a major alternative approach to temporal reasoning, via two-sorted rst-order
logic (see, e.g., [2, 3, 12, 13]).
8.1. Two-sorted temporal logic
Consider a rst-order logic with two sorts: domain and time. The language TS of
the logic is based on the following alphabet:
 an innite set of individual variables x0; x1; : : : and a set of constants c0; c1; : : : of
domain sort,
 an innite set of individual variables t0; t1; : : : of temporal sort,
 the binary predicate symbol < of sort ‘temporal  temporal’,
 predicate symbols P0; P1; : : : of sort ‘temporal  domainn’, n<!.
Formulas of TS are dened inductively:
 ti<tj is an (atomic) formula, for temporal variables ti, tj,
 P(t; x1; : : : ; xn) is an (atomic) formula, for a predicate symbol P of sort temporal 
domainn, t a temporal variable, and x1; : : : ; xn domain variables,
 if ’ and  are formulas, t a temporal variable, and x a domain variable, then :’,
’^  , 8t’, and 8x’ are formulas.
TS is interpreted in rst-order temporal models of the usual form M= hF ; D; Ii,
where F = hW;<i is a ow of time (i.e., a strict linear order), D is a non-empty set,
the domain of M, and I is a function associating with every moment of time w2W
a rst-order L-structure
I(w)= hD; PI(w)0 ; : : : ; cI(w)0 ; : : :i;
in which PI(w)i , for each i, is a predicate on D of arity n whenever Pi is of arity n+1,
and cI(w)i 2D.
An assignment in M is a function a = a1 [ a2 such that a1 associates with every
temporal variable t a moment of time a1(t)2W and a2 associates with every domain
variable x an element a2(x) of D.
The truth relation M j=a ’ is dened inductively as follows:
 M j=a ti<tj i F j= a1(ti)<a1(tj),
 M j=a P(t; x1; : : : ; xn) i ha2(x1); : : : ; a2(xn)i 2PI(a1(t)),
 M j=a 8t’ i M j=b ’ for every assignment b that may dier from a only on t,
 M j=a 8x’ i M j=b ’ for every assignment b that may dier from a only on x,
and the standard clauses for the booleans.
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It should be clear that the temporal operators U and S of TL are expressible in
TS. On the other hand, there are TS-formulas that are not expressible in TL over
any interesting class of ows of time (see below). It turns out, however, that TL and
TL1 are expressively complete for some natural fragments of TS.
Denition 61. Let TS1t (respectively, TS1x) consist of all TS-formulas ’ without
subformulas of the form 8x (8t ) such that  contains more than one free temporal
(respectively, domain) variable. Let TS1 =TS1t \TS1x.
Suppose that each n-ary predicate symbol Qi of TL is associated with the (n+1)-
ary predicate symbol Pi of TS. Dene a translation y from TL into TS by taking,
for some xed temporal variable t,
Qi(x1; : : : ; xn)y=Pi(t; x1; : : : ; xn);
(’^  )y=’y^  y;
(:’)y=: (’y);
(8x’)y=8x(’y);
( U’)y=9 t0 (t<t0 ^’yft0=tg^8t00(t<t00<t0!  yft00=tg));
( S’)y=9 t0 (t0<t ^’yft0=tg^8t00(t0<t00<t!  yft00=tg));
where t0 and t00 are new temporal variables.
Note that for every TL-formula ’, we have ’y 2TS1t , and for every ’2TL1 we
have ’y 2TS1.
The meaning of the translation y is explained by:
Denition 62. Let M= hF; D; Ii be a TS-model and a =(a1; a2) an assignment in M.
Let N= hF ; D; J i be a TL-model, b an assignment in N. We say that hM; a i and
hN ; b i are equivalent, and write hM; a ihN ; b i, if P I(w)i =QJ (w)i for all w, i, and
a2= b.
Lemma 63. Suppose hM; a i hN; bi. Then for every TL-formula ’ and every mo-
ment of time w; if a (t)=w then
hN ; wi j=b ’ i M j=a ’y:
Proof. An easy induction on ’.
Denition 64. Let F be a class of ows of time, L0TL, and L00TS. We say
that L0 is expressively complete for L00 on F if for every ’2L00 with at most
one free temporal variable, there exists a formula ’^2L0 such that (’^)y and ’ are
equivalent in all models based on ows of time in F.
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Theorem 65. Let F be any class of dedekind-complete ows of time ( for example;
the class fhN;<i; hZ;<i; hR;<ig[ fF : F a nite linear orderg). Then
1. TL is expressively complete for TS1t on F.
2. TL1 is expressively complete for TS1 on F.
Proof. By Kamp’s theorem [26, see also 16, Chapters 9{12], the propositional tem-
poral logic with S and U is expressively complete for monadic rst-order logic
over F. So for any formula ’(t; P1; : : : ; Pk) of monadic rst-order logic with one
free variable t and unary predicates P1; : : : ; Pk , we may x a propositional tempo-
ral formula ’(p1; : : : ; pk) such that for every rst-order structure M based on a ow
of time F = hW;<i 2F, and every valuation V in F with V(pi)=PMi , we
have
hhF ;Vi; wi j= ’ i M j= ’[w=t]; for all w2W:
For  2TS1t with a free temporal variable t, if any, and  0 2TL, we say that  0
expresses  if the translation ( 0)y of  0 is equivalent to  in any rst-order temporal
model based on a ow of time in F. Suppose now that = (t; Q1; : : : ; Qk)2TS1t .
We prove that for every subformula  of  with at most one free temporal vari-
able, there is a TL-formula  ^ that expresses  . The proof is by induction
on  .
Case 1:  is atomic. If  = t<t, then put  ^ =?. If  =Qi(t; x1; : : : ; xn), then put
 ^ =Pi(x1; : : : ; xn).
Case 2:  =8x 1. By the induction hypothesis, there exists b 1 that expresses  1.
But then,  ^ =8x b 1 expresses  .
Case 3: otherwise. Let  1; : : : ;  l be a list of all subformulas of  of the form either
Qi(t0; y1; : : : ; yn) or 8z 0 that have an occurrence in  that is not within the scope of
a domain quantier 8y. Since  2TS1t , every  i of the form 8z 0i has at most one
free temporal variable. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, there exists c i 2TL that
expresses  i, for each i6l.
Now replace in  every occurrence of a  i(t0) that is not within the scope of a
8y by a predicate symbol Q i(t0) of the monadic rst-order logic. Denote the result-
ing monadic rst-order formula by  0(t; Q 1 ; : : : ; Q l). Take the propositional formula
 0(q 1 ; : : : ; q l), and in it, replace every propositional variable q i by c i. The resulting
formula  ^ clearly expresses  .
This completes the induction. So there is a TL-formula ^ expressing , proving
the former claim of the theorem. To prove the latter, it is enough to observe that if
 2TS1 then  ^ 2TL1.
Remark 66. Clearly, the TS-sentence
9 t1 9 t2(t1<t2 ^8x(P(t1; x)$P(t2; x)))
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is not in TS1t . By results of [27, 3, 2], it cannot be expressed in TL over the ow of
time hQ;<i nor over the class of all nite linear ows. It follows from Theorem 65
that over these ows, it is not equivalent to any TS1t-sentence.
For a class H of ows of time, denote by TS(H) the set of all TS-sentences
that are true in all models based on frames in H, and by TSn(H) the set of TS-
sentences true in all models based on frames in H and having nite domains. Given
a set TL0TL1, let
TS0= f’2TS1 : ’^2TL0g;
where ’^ is as dened in the proof of Theorem 65. Since ’^ is constructed eectively
from ’ (see [26]), as an immediate consequence of Lemma 63 and Theorem 65 we
obtain the following:
Corollary 67. Suppose that every F 2H is dedekind-complete; and that TL0TL1.
If the fragment TL(H)\TL0 is decidable; then the fragment TS(H)\TS0 is de-
cidable. If the fragment TLn(H)\TL0 is decidable; then the fragment TSn(H)\
TS0 is decidable.
8.2. Two-variable fragment
We remind the reader that the language TL21 contains all monodic TL-formulas
with at most two variables. Let TS21 be the sublanguage of TS1 whose formulas
contain at most two domain variables. Clearly, TS21 = f’2TS1 : ’^2TL21 g. Below,
F will denote any of the classes of ows of time mentioned in the formulation of
Theorem 15 { that is,
1. fhN;<ig,
2. fhZ;<ig,
3. fhQ;<ig,
4. the class of all nite strict linear orders,
5. any rst-order-denable class of strict linear orders.
F+ will range over these and fhR;<ig. G will be one of hN;<i; hZ;<i, and the
class of all nite strict linear orders, and G+ will range over these and fhR;<ig.
Theorem 68. The fragments TL(F)\TL21 ; TLn(F+)\TL21 ; TS(G)\TS21 ; and
TSn(G+)\TS21 are decidable.
Proof. The L-formula C , corresponding to a state candidate C for a formula ’2
TL21, contains at most two individual variables. As is well known (see [41, 33]),
the satisability problem for such formulas is decidable. Moreover, as the two variable
fragment of L has the nite model property, the nite satisability is decidable as well.
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All that remains is to use the criteria of Theorems 15, 26, and 36 and Corollaries 37
and 67.
As TL21 contains the set TL
1 of TL-formulas with at most one variable, TS21
contains the set TS11 of TS1-formulas with at most one domain variable, and TS
1
1 =
f’2TS1 : ’^2TL1g, we also have:
Corollary 69. The fragments TL(F)\TL1; TLn(F+)\TL1; TS(G)\TS11 ;
and TSn(G+)\TS11 are decidable.
Remark 70. It is worth noting that the set of formulas TL1 corresponds to the propo-
sitional language LS;U; with the temporal operators S; U and the modal (epistemic)
operator . Indeed, we may dene a translation T from LS;U; onto TL1 by taking,
for a xed individual variable x,
T(pi)=Pi(x);
T(’^  )= T(’)^ T( );
T(:’)=: T(’);
T(’U )= T(’)UT( );
T(’S )= T(’)ST( );
T(’)=8x T(’):
Recall that the product L  S5 of a propositional temporal logic L, determined by a
class H of linear orders hW;<i, and S5 is the set of all formulas in LS;U; that are
valid in frames of the form hW V;<;i, where hW;<i 2H; V is a non-empty set,
hw; vi<hw0; v0i i v= v0 and w<w0, and  is an equivalence relation on WV dened
by hw; vihw0; v0i i w=w0. For more information on products of modal logics, we
refer the reader to [18].
It is easy to see that a formula ’2LS;U; belongs to L  S5 i T(’) is valid
in all rst-order temporal models based on linear orders hW;<i validating L. Thus
we obtain, for example, that L(N) S5 is decidable, where L(N) denotes the propo-
sitional temporal logic determined by hN;<i. Observe that this logic coincides with
the temporal-epistemic logic from [15] of one agent who does not forget, does not
learn, and who knows time (the decidability of which is of course known
already).
We do not know whether the logic L(N) f S5, determined by the class of frames
of the form hN  V;<;i with nite V , has been considered in the literature. This
logic, the propositional version of TLn(N)\TL1, is dierent from the temporal-
epistemic logic L(N)S5 (the proof is similar to that of Theorem 25) and corresponds
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to the assumption that there are only nitely many possible runs of the multi-agent
system.
8.3. Monadic fragment
One more interesting fragment of TL is the set TLmo of monadic temporal for-
mulas. The corresponding fragment TSmo consists of those TS-formulas involving
only predicate symbols of sort ‘temporaldomain’ or ‘temporal’. As was shown in
Section 2, the fragments TL2 \TLmo \TL(N) and TL2 \TLmo\TLn(N) are un-
decidable. However, this is not the case for the languages TLmo1 =TL1 \TLmo and
TSmo1 =TS1 \TSmo. For then, the formula C , corresponding to a state candidate
C for ’2TLmo1 , is a monadic L-formula, and as is well known (see [29]), the
monadic fragment of rst-order logic is decidable and has the nite model property.
This yields:
Theorem 71. The fragments TL(F)\TLmo1 ; TLn(F+)\TLmo1 ; TS(G)\TSmo1 ;
and TSn(G+)\TSmo1 are decidable.
8.4. Guarded fragment
Let us consider now the following natural generalization of the rst-order guarded
formulas of [5].
Denition 72 (guarded fragment). Denote by TGF the smallest set of TL-formulas
such that
 every atomic formula is in TGF;
 if ’ and  are in TGF, then so are ’^  ; :’; ’S , and ’U ;
 if x; y are tuples of variables, G(x; y) is atomic, ’(x; y)2TGF, and every free
variable occurring in ’(x; y) occurs in G(x; y) as well, then 8 y (G(x; y)!’(x; y))
is in TGF.
The set TGF is called the guarded fragment of the rst-order temporal language.
We write GF for the guarded fragment L\TGF of the rst-order language L.
Note that unlike the guarded fragment GF of classical rst-order logic, which is
known to be decidable (see [5]), the temporal guarded fragment interpreted in time
structures hN;<i and hZ;<i turns out to be even not recursively enumerable.
Theorem 73. Let F be either hN;<i or hZ;<i. Then TL(F )\TL2 \TGF is not
recursively enumerable.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. We simply write down the required
formula ’T for a given set of tiles T = ft0; : : : ; tng.
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Let R be a binary predicate and P0; : : : ; Pn, Q unary ones. Dene ’T to be the
conjunction of the following formulas:
9 x(Q(x)^  P0(x));
8x(Q(x)!9y(R(x; y)^Q(y)));
+ 8x(Q(x)! © Q(x));
8x; y(R(x; y)! R(x; y));
+ 8x
0@Q(x)! n_
i=0
Pi(x)^
^
i 6=j
(Pi(x)!:Pj (x))
1A ;
+ 8x
0@Pi(x)!8y
0@R(x; y)! _
up(ti)=down(tj)
Pj (y)
1A1A ;
+ 8x
0@Pi(x)! © _
right(ti)=left(tj)
Pj(x)
1A :
Clearly, ’T belongs to TL2 \TGF. It is readily seen that ’T is satisable in F i
there is a recurrent tiling of NN by T .
We may dene the guarded fragment SGF ofTS, as follows: every atomic formula
is in SGF, SGF is closed under the boolean connectives and temporal quantica-
tion 8t, and if x; y are tuples of variables, G(t; x; y) is atomic, ’(t; x; y)2SGF, and
every free domain variable of ’ occurs in G(t; x; y), then 8 y(G(t; x; y)!’(t; x; y))
2SGF.
Let TGF1 =TGF\TL1, and SGF1 =SGF\TS1.
Theorem 74. The fragments TL(F)\TGF1; TLn(F+)\TGF1; TS(G)\SGF1;
and TSn(G+)\SGF1 are decidable.
Proof. By Theorems 15, 26, and 36, and Corollary 37, the result for the TL-classes
in the theorem may be established by showing that given ’2TGF1, it is decidable
whether a given state candidate for ’ is (nitely) realizable. It is evident from the
proof of Theorem 65 that TGF1 is expressively complete for SGF1 over G;G+. So
the result for the TS-classes in the theorem follows from this and Corollary 67.
So let ’2TGF1 and let C = hT; T coni be a state candidate for ’. By Lemma 8, to
decide whether C is (nitely) realizable it suces to show that it is decidable whether
the L-sentence
C =
^
t2T
9x t(x)^8x
_
t2T
t(x)^
^
ht; ci2Tcon
t(c)
has a (nite) model.
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The formulas t(x), t(c) are in GF, but C is not. However, we can transform
it into a guarded sentence as follows. Let P be a new unary predicate. Observe
that if  2GF then the relativization  P of  to P is logically equivalent to a GF-
formula. For atomic  ,  P =  2GF; the boolean cases are trivial; and for guarded
 (x; y) and atomic G(x; y), ((9y1; : : : ; yn(G(x; y)^  ))P is by denition 9y1; : : : ;
yn(
V
16i6n P(yi)^G(x; y)^ P), which is equivalent to 9y1; : : : ; yn(G(x; y)^ (
V
16i6n
P(yi)^  P)) and hence is (inductively) equivalent to a guarded formula. Now,
(C )P =
^
t2T
9 x(P(x)^ t P(x)) ^ 8x
 
P(x)!
_
t2T
t P(x)
!
^
^
ht; ci2Tcon
t P(c);
and we see that, up to logical equivalence; (C)P 2GF.
By classical model theory, C has a (nite) model i (C)P has a (respectively,
nite) model. Since (C)P is logically equivalent to a GF-sentence, and by results of
[5, 21], GF is decidable and has the nite model property, we see that it is decidable
whether C has a (nite) model, as required.
8.5. Temporal description logics
The notion of quasimodel used in this paper is actually a generalization of the
quasimodels introduced in [46] to prove the decidability of the satisability prob-
lems for the temporal description logic CIQUS (i.e., the description logic CIQ of
De Giacomo and Lenzerini [20] extended with Since and Until) in models based on
the time structures hN;<i and hZ;<i. However, the satisability problems in hQ;<i
and arbitrary strict linear orders were left open in that paper. Using the embedding
technique of Section 4, one can show that these problems are decidable too. Thus, we
have:
Theorem 75. There are algorithms that are capable of deciding whether a given
CIQUS-formula is satisable in
 hN;<i;
 hZ;<i;
 hQ;<i;
 nite linear orders;
 arbitrary strict linear orders.
Note, however, that CIQ (which is actually CPDL with qualied number restric-
tions or counting modalities) does not have the nite model property, and it is not
known whether the nite model reasoning in it is decidable. So we cannot say whether
the satisability problem for CIQUS-formulas is decidable in models with nite do-
mains. For more information on the connection between multi-dimensional description
logics and rst-order modal logic, see [47].
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9. Open questions
We end the paper with some problems arising from the work above.
1. Do our results extend to the ow of time hR;<i with arbitrary domains? Or with
countable domains? (The logic here is dierent { see Theorem 25.)
2. Can our results be extended to logics over non-linear ows of time, such as historical
necessity logics, and CTL?
3. What is the computational complexity of satisability of an arbitrary monodic for-
mula ’ over the ows of time considered earlier, given an oracle for determining
if a state candidate for ’ is realizable?
4. Are there other natural decidable (and expressive) fragments of TL?
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Robin Hirsch, Agnes Kurucz, Maarten Marx, and Szabolcs Mikulas
for stimulating discussions, comments and suggestions. The work of the rst author was
partially supported by UK EPSRC grant GR=L85978. The work of the third author was
partially supported by UK EPSRC Visiting Fellowship GR=M36748 and by Grant No.
99-01-0986 from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
References
[1] M. Abadi, The power of temporal proofs, Proc. Symp. on Logic in Computer Science, Ithaca, June
1987, pp. 176{186.
[2] S. Abiteboul, L. Herr, J. van den Bussche, Temporal connectives versus explicit timestamps in temporal
query languages, in: J. Cliord, A. Tuzhilin (Eds.), Recent Advances in Temporal Databases, Springer,
Berlin, 1995, pp. 43{57.
[3] S. Abiteboul, L. Herr, J. van den Bussche, Temporal versus rst-order logic in query temporal databases,
ACM Symp. on Principles of Database Systems, Montreal, Canada, 1996, pp. 49{57.
[4] H. Andreka, I. Nemeti, I, Sain, Completeness problems in verication of programs and program schemes,
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 1979, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer,
Berlin, 1979.
[5] H. Andreka, I. Nemeti, J. van Benthem, Modal languages and bounded fragments of predicate logic, J.
Philos. Logic 27 (1998) 217{274.
[6] A. Artale, E. Franconi, A computational account for a description logic of time and action, Proc. 4th
Conf. on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Montreal, Canada, Morgan Kaufman,
Los Altos, CA, 1994, pp. 3{14.
[7] A. Artale, E. Franconi, Temporal description logics, in: L. Vila, P. van Beek, M. Boddy, M. Fisher,
D. Gabbay, A. Galton, R. Morris (Eds.), Handbook of Time and Temporal Reasoning in Articial
Intelligence, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, to appear.
[8] F. Baader, H.J. Ohlbach, A multi-dimensional terminological knowledge representation language, J.
Appl. Non-Classical Logic 5 (1995) 153{197.
[9] E. Borger, E. Gradel, Yu. Gurevich, The Classical Decision Problem, Perspectives in Mathematical
Logic, Springer, Berlin, 1997.
[10] J.R. Buchi. On a decision method in restricted second-order arithmetic, Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science: Proc. 1960 Int. Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1962, pp.
1{11.
I. Hodkinson et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 106 (2000) 85{134 133
[11] J.P. Burgess, Y. Gurevich, The decision problem for linear temporal logic, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
26 (2) (1985) 115{128.
[12] J. Chomicki, Temporal query languages: a survey, in: D. Gabbay, H.J. Ohlbach (Eds.), Temporal Logic,
1st Int. Conf., Springer, Berlin, Lecture Notes in Articial Intelligence, Vol. 827, 1994, pp. 506{534.
[13] J. Chomicki, D. Niwinski, On the feasibility of checking temporal integrity constraints, J. Comput.
Systems Sci. 51 (1995) 523{535.
[14] E.A. Emerson, Temporal and modal logic, in: J. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Handbook of Theoretical Computer
Science, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. 996{1076.
[15] R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Y. Moses, M. Vardi, Reasoning about Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1995.
[16] D. Gabbay, I. Hodkinson, M. Reynolds, Temporal Logic. Part I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.
[17] D. Gabbay, M. Reynolds, M. Finger, Temporal Logic. Part II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, to appear.
[18] D. Gabbay, V. Shehtman, Products of modal logics, Part I, J. IGPL 6 (1998) 73{146.
[19] J.W. Garson, Quantication in modal logic, in: D.M. Gabbay, F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of
Philosophical Logic, Vol. 2, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1984, pp. 249{307.
[20] G. De Giacomo, M. Lenzerini, TBox and ABox reasoning in expressive description logics, Proc. 5th
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Montreal, Canada, Morgan
Kaufman, Los Altos, CA, 1996, pp. 316{327.
[21] E. Gradel, On the restraining power of guards, J. Symbolic Logic 64 (1999) 1719{1742.
[22] Y. Gurevich, Elementary properties of ordered abelian groups, Algebra and Logic 3 (1964) 5{39.
(Russian; an English version is in Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 46 (1965) 165{192).
[23] Y. Gurevich, Expanded theory of ordered abelian groups, Ann. Math. Logic 12 (1977) 193{228.
[24] D. Harel, Eective transformations on innite trees, with applications to high undecidability, dominoes,
and fairness, J. ACM 33 (1986) 224{248.
[25] W. Hodges, Model Theory, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications, Vol. 42, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1993.
[26] H. Kamp, Tense logic and the theory of linear order, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los
Angeles, 1968.
[27] H. Kamp, Formal properties of \now", Theoria 37 (1971) 237{273.
[28] H. Lauchli, J. Leonard, On the elementary theory of linear order, Fund. Math. 59 (1966) 109{116.
[29] L. Lowenheim, Uber Moglichkeiten im Relativkalkul, Math. Ann. 76 (1915) 447{470.
[30] Z. Manna, A. Pnueli, The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems: Specication, Springer,
Berlin, 1992.
[31] Z. Manna, A. Pnueli, Temporal Verication of Reactive Systems: Safety, Springer, Berlin, 1995.
[32] S. Merz, Decidability and incompleteness results for rst-order temporal logics of linear time, J. Appl.
Non-Classical Logic 2 (1992).
[33] M. Mortimer, On languages with two variables, Z. Math. Logik Grundlagen Math. 21 (1975) 135{140.
[34] A. Pnueli, Applications of temporal logic to the specication and verication of reactive systems,
a survey of current trends, in Current Trends in Concurrency, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, Berlin, 1986, pp. 510{584.
[35] M.O. Rabin, Decidability of second order theories and automata on innite trees, Trans. Amer. Math.
Soc. 141 (1969) 1{35.
[36] M.O. Rabin, Decidable theories, in: J. Barwise (Ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Logic, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 595{629.
[37] F.P. Ramsey, On a problem of formal logic, Proc. London Math. Soc. 30 (1930) 264{286.
[38] M. Reynolds, Axiomatising rst-order temporal logic: until and since over linear time, Studia Logica
57 (1996) 279{302.
[39] J.G. Rosenstein, Linear Orderings, Academic Press, New York, 1982.
[40] K. Schild, Combining terminological logics with tense logic, Proc. 6th Portuguese Conf. on Articial
Intelligence, Porto, 1993, pp. 105{120.
[41] D. Scott, A decision method for validity of sentences in two variables, J. Symbolic Logic 27 (1962)
477.
[42] A. Sernadas, Temporal aspect of logical procedure denition, Inform. Systems 5 (1980) 167{187.
[43] C. Stirling, Modal and temporal logics, in: S. Abramsky, D.M. Gabbay, T.S.E. Maibaum (Eds.),
Handbook of Logic in Computer Science, Vol. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 478{551.
134 I. Hodkinson et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 106 (2000) 85{134
[44] A. Szalas, Concerning the semantic consequence relation in rst-order temporal logic, J. Theoret.
Comput. Sci. 47 (1986) 329{334.
[45] A. Szalas, L. Holenderski, Incompleteness of rst-order temporal logic with Until, J. Theoret. Comput.
Sci. 57 (1988) 317{325.
[46] F. Wolter, M. Zakharyaschev, Temporalizing description logics, Proc. FroCoS’98, Amsterdam, 1998.
in ‘Frontiers of Combining Systems’, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2000, to appear. See
http://www.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/wolter.
[47] F. Wolter, M. Zakharyaschev, Decidable fragments of rst-order modal logics, Submitted. See
http://www.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/wolter, 1999.
